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Abstract 
 
This thesis explains why banks fail in general, and why Ghana Co-operative 
Bank Ltd (Co-op) in particular, failed. Many nations have experienced bank 
failures with very high costs which can lead to systemic risks. The causes of 
bank failure are numerous, in theory, and include regulation of banking 
activities such as forbearance; asymmetric information leading to a moral 
hazard problem and connected lending. Continued study of the various causes 
of banking instability is needed. The thesis extends that area of study with a 
case study of an African bank which failed. 
 
Co-op, a Ghanaian bank, is used to test the theories on some causes of bank 
failure. Before the liquidation, the appropriateness of preparing Co-op’s 
financial statements as a going concern was questioned by its external auditors. 
The framework used to assess the failure of Co-op is the findings of earlier 
empirical studies on this topic. Empirical evidence, using Co-op’s financial 
statements is tested against theory. Competitive theories on causes of bank 
failure are also used in the analysis. Most of the causes of Co-op’s failure are 
found to have been the subject of previous research. 
 
Key-words: systemic risk, regulation, forbearance, asymmetric information, 
moral hazard, connected lending, going concern. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This first chapter provides the background of “Some Causes of Bank Failure: 
A Case Study of Ghana Co-operative Bank Ltd (Co-op)”. The chapter presents 
the problem, purpose, scope and delimitations of the thesis. An outline of the 
rest of the thesis then follows in order to facilitate the reading. 
 
1.1  Background 
 
Bank failures are usually followed by unfavorable consequences on 
stakeholders outside the failed banks themselves. Sometimes the consequences 
are felt by the non-banking system as a whole. A failure can result in much 
harm to employment, earnings, financial development and other associated 
public interests. Smith & Walter (1997: 158). According to Hooks (1994) and 
Benston & Kaufman (1996, cited by Kaufman, 1996), the failure of a bank has 
great adverse effect on the economy and so is considered very important. 
 
The number of failing banks has been on the increase as reported around the 
world. Many important industrial nations have experienced upsetting bank 
failures such as the following: Herstatt Bank in Germany (Smith & Walter, 
1997: 157; Heffernan, 1996: 271), Banco Ambrosiano in Italy (Smith & 
Walter, 1997: 157; Heffernan, 1996: 272-273), Barings Bank in the United 
Kingdom (Gray et al., 2001: 23-24; Heffernan, 1996: 282-288), BCCI (Smith 
& Walter, 1997: 157; Heffernan, 1996: 280-282), Rumasa in Spain (Caprio & 
Honohan, 1999), Crédit Lyonnais in France (Smith & Walter, 1997: 157; 
Heffernan, 1996: 387-406; Fitchett, 1996) and Daiwa Bank in Japan 
(www.lectlaw.com). 
 
The failure of banks and the related costs have also been emphasized by many 
writers. Kaufman (1996) explains that banking crisis generates losses to 
stakeholders by disturbing the settlement system, and even has a systemic 
effect on the entire economy. Caprio & Klingebiel (1999) also present 
information on 114 episodes of banking crises in 46 countries. Given the focus 
on a Ghanaian bank, we think that the costs of failures of some African banks 
(table 1) might be of particular interest. The costs of the failures shown in the 
table differ from country to country. Different costs are included in total cost 
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differently by each country. Examples of such costs are those related to 
corporate restructuring and restructuring/recapitalization of the banking system. 
The estimated total losses/costs shown in this table exclude the portion incurred 
by depositors and borrowers from non-performing loans. Additionally, some of 
the figures exclude costs related to indirect methods used to bail out banks. 
 
Table 1:  Representative Cases of Some African Bank Failures 
A Study by Caprio & Klingebiel 
 
Country Scope of crisis Estimate of total losses/costs 
Benin 
1988-1990 
All three commercial banks collapsed; 
80% of banks’ loan portfolio was non-
performing. 
CFA 95 billion, equivalent to 17% 
of GDP. 
Côte d’Ivoire 
1988-1991 
Four large banks affected, which 
accounted for 90% of banking system 
loans; three definitely and one perhaps 
insolvent. Six Government banks were 
closed. 
Government costs estimated at CFA 
677 billion equivalent to 25% of 
GDP. 
Ghana 
1982-1989 
Seven audited banks (out of 11) 
insolvent; rural banking sector 
affected. 
Restructuring costs estimated at 6% 
of GNP. 
Guinea 
1985 
Six banks accounting for 99% of total 
system deposits deemed insolvent. 
Repayment of deposits amounted to 
3% of 1986 GDP. 
Senegal 
1988–1991 
In 1988, 50% of banking system loans 
was non-performing. Six commercial 
banks and one development bank 
closed accounting for roughly 20-30% 
of financial system assets. 
U.S.$ 830 million, which is 
equivalent to 17% of GDP. 
Zambia 
1995 
Meridian Bank became insolvent 
which accounted for 13% of 
commercial bank assets. 
Rough estimate of U.S.$ 50 million 
(1,4% of GDP). 
 
As regards Co-op, according to the official liquidator (September 2000), the 
Ghanaian Government established a special method to ease the distress of 
depositors and affected employees of Co-op. It cost the Government ø1 28 
billion and ø 9 billion to respond to the interests of depositors and employees 
respectively. 
 
                                          
1 ¢: Ghanaian monetary unit, the cedi. 
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The concern about financial stability has been newsworthy for a long time. 
(Hooks, 1994). It is obvious that financial instability is an important topic to 
both developed and emerging market economies (Clement, 2001). The cost 
burden associated with bank failures is so disturbing that the need for continued 
study of the causes of banking financial instability, on both the practical and 
theoretical levels, cannot be over-emphasized. 
 
There are many competing theories explaining the causes of bank failure. One 
theory attributes the failure to government intervention while another says it is 
due to some endogenous2 instability. A study by Kindleberger (1989, cited by 
Hooks 1994: 37) showed that a bank failure results from rapid expansion of 
bank credit. Some other causes of bank crisis include legislation, deposit 
insurance, lack of skills, mismanagement and lack of regulation (Palubinskas & 
Stough, 1999). Hempel & Simonson (1999) also believe that mismanagement, 
regulatory and legislative interference cause a bank failure. Chu (1996) adds 
free banking to the reasons why banks fail. 
 
In this paper we test predictions of some causes of bank failure using 
information uniquely available in respect of Ghana Co-operative Bank Ltd. 
(Co-op) that was liquidated in 2000. Co-op was established in 1974 and 
became a limited liability company in 1992, under the Ghana Companies Code, 
1963 (Act 179). Its head office was at Kwame Nkrumah Avenue, Accra, 
Ghana, West Africa. At the time of its failure and eventual liquidation in 
January 2000, it had 415 employees and 21 branches. It had a negative net 
worth of ø 43,7 billion. The mission of Co-op was to provide full commercial 
banking services and to play a savings mobilization role. Its corporate plan was 
to attract more institutions to do business with, to ensure maximum customer 
satisfaction and to become more competitive. The business objectives of Co-op 
were export financing, business advisory services, support services to co-
operative societies and employment for adequate skilled staff (An anonymous 
source). Co-op persistently encountered difficulties meeting the regulatory 
requirements of the central bank (www.ghanaweb.com). 
 
 
                                          
2 Endogenous: Originating or produced from within. 
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1.2  Problem 
 
Recognizing and describing the research topic is vital in writing a thesis, so 
enough time should be devoted to it. The research topic should be meaningful 
and structural and solve questions of what, who, where, why and how. This 
approach will indicate the correct strategy to apply. For instance, what the 
research is about gives meaning to the topic. A “who,” “what,” “where,” 
“why,” or “how” question shows a firm structural starting point of the research 
(Yin, 1994). 
 
As mentioned in the background, people of today, especially bankers, 
economists, and regulators, to an increasing extent, are much concerned with 
financial stability. They generally accept that banks are special and that bank 
runs or failures are costly to the whole economy, and therefore, banking 
stability is very important (Chu, 1996). Banks are institutions that accept 
deposits (money people leave in an institution with the understanding that they 
can get it back at any time or at an agreed-upon future time), and make loans 
(money lent out to a borrower to be paid back with interest). This action of 
taking deposits and making loans is called financial intermediation. In addition 
to these functions, most people and businesses pay their bills with bank 
checking accounts, placing banks at the center of the payments system. Banks 
are therefore special because of these functions and also because of the major 
role banks play as instruments of the government's monetary policy. The 
research question is Why do banks fail in general and in particular why did Co-
op fail? 
 
1. 3  Purpose of the Study 
 
As a graduate research work, the case study adds a distinctive knowledge of 
facts on a body - be it individual, organizational, social, or political. The 
purpose of this study is to determine whether the causes of the failure of Co-op 
have already been a subject of well-formulated theories (Yin, 1994). 
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1.4  Scope and Delimitations 
 
The sample about which the findings and conclusion are to be made from is 
one of the recent liquidated banks in the banking history in Ghana, West 
Africa, called Co-op. Co-op was chosen because its failure represents a 
significant case in assessing the theories on some causes of bank failure. One 
important contribution of this thesis is the novel data set on Co-op we analyze. 
 
We realize that the data on one case are not enough to test the theories on some 
causes of bank failure. However, there are reasons for the choice of only one 
bank for the study. The time frame for the research work is too short to enable 
us to obtain bank-level data on more than one bank. Also, in many cases, such 
a multi-bank study would have required our traveling to as many countries as 
possible for the data, which would have been too expensive to bear, because we 
did not have any financial sponsorship for the research. Hence, even though 
many countries have suffered bank failures at some point in time, inadequate 
resources and time have compelled us to restrict our study to Co-op alone. 
Another delimiting factor is that some detailed comprehensive and reliable data 
on Co-op itself are also not available. Examples of such data are the Banking 
Supervision Department (BSD) examination reports on Co-op. We recognize 
that access to such classified data could have provided further insight for the 
study. 
 
In the case of Co-op we only have data from 1994 to 1999/2000 but the validity 
is difficult to establish, because we do not have resources to ascertain the 
market values of the data. Likewise it is not clear when a bank crisis ends and 
as such, as of 2002, the liquidator of Co-op is still handling issues related to its 
failure. Despite certain limitations to data, we believe that Co-op is an 
interesting case study because it offers the possibility for an original 
contribution to the knowledge on some causes of bank failure, given the 
acknowledged limited scope of our study. 
 
1.5  Outline of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into five main parts with one or more chapters for each 
part. The main parts are Prologue; Theoretical Framework; Empirical Study; 
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Analysis and Review; Conclusion and Recommendations. A List of References 
and Appendices follow. The Prologue provides the readers with an introduction 
to the subject and the thesis writing process. The second part, consisting of the 
Theoretical Framework, gives a description of the theories we found suitable to 
the research. The third part is the Empirical Study. This part provides an 
overview of the Ghanaian economy. Here, we present the Ghanaian financial 
sector, and then describe the banking regulations in Ghana. The case study of 
Co-op is done in this part. The fourth part is the Analysis and Review, where 
the preceding chapters are utilized to analyze and review the theoretical and 
empirical findings in an effort to give answers to the problem. The fifth part 
comprises Conclusion, Recommendations and Suggestions for Further 
Research. 
 
The following is a description of the organization of the chapters. Chapter one, 
which is the Introduction, deals with the background, problem discussion, 
purpose, scope and delimitations of the thesis. Chapter two describes the 
methodology. In chapter three the theories on some of the factors behind 
banking crisis are analyzed and reviewed. Chapter four gives the overview of 
the Ghanaian economy. A case study of Ghana Co-operative Bank Ltd. (Co-op) 
is developed in chapter five, as empirical implications of some causes of bank 
failure. An analysis and review of the theoretical and empirical findings is 
made in chapter six. Additionally, some rival (competing) theories are looked 
at in this chapter as advised by Yin (1994:108-109). Chapter seven concludes 
the thesis by giving some recommendations for the Ghanaian banking sector to 
help prevent or eliminate recurrence of bank failures. Chapter eight offers some 
suggestions for further research. 
 
In summary, chapter one gives the background of “Some Causes of Bank 
Failure”. It presents the problem, purpose, scope and delimitations of the study, 
concluding with an outline of the thesis. Bank failures can result in much harm 
to the economy and so are considered very important and many writers have 
emphasized costs related to banking crisis. For instance, in the case of Co-op, it 
cost the Ghanaian Government cedi (Ghanaian monetary unit) ø 28 billion and 
ø 9 billion to respond to the interests of depositors and employees, respectively. 
The costs and effects of banking instability necessitate a study of the causes of 
banking crisis. Many different hypotheses give explanations of the causes of 
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the failures. This thesis tests the hypotheses, using the failure of Co-op as an 
empirical study. 
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2.  METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter gives the basis for choosing the methodology of the thesis. Data 
collection methods, kinds of measuring instruments and the system for 
managing the measure are all important factors. An in-depth explanation of the 
process of analysis used to test each of the stated assertions is presented. How 
the problem was resolved is also described. 
 
2.1  Research Method 
 
The preference of a methodology influences the results of the research 
(Zeijersborger & Wiklund, 2000). In answering the question that we set for 
ourselves in the problem statement, we studied the causes of the failure of Co-
op in the light of some different existing literatures on some causes of bank 
failure. We approached our research through theoretical and empirical analysis 
from secondary sources. In the theoretical approach, the study covered the 
theories on some causes of bank failure. In the empirical approach, we used the 
single case study method because it gave us a holistic view and a deeper 
understanding of the studied research problem. Another reason for choosing a 
single-case study is that it shows the critical proof of a vital theory (Yin, 1994: 
40). The case study covered the Overview of the Ghanaian Economy, the 
Financial Sector of Ghana and Banking Regulations in Ghana. We also 
investigated the causes of the failure of Co-op. Then we related the existing 
theories to the actual causes of the failure of Co-op. As part of the conclusion, 
recommendations were made for the Ghanaian banking sector to help prevent 
or eliminate recurrence of a bank failure. 
 
2.2  Conceptual Framework 
 
The research used a positivist framework. We therefore collected, analyzed, 
reviewed and interpreted existing theories based on empirical studies on the 
subject matter. Next, we compared the predictions with the case study, in order 
to reach clear, interpretative results. This approach enabled us to evaluate the 
research issue objectively (Javefors, 2002). 
Some Causes of Bank Failure - Methodology 
12 
2.3  Research Approach 
 
Yin (1994) distinguishes between five research approaches: experimental, 
survey, archival analysis, history and case study. The variables that guide 
investigators to choose a strategy depend on the types of research questions 
posed, the extent of control over behavioral events and the relative focus on 
contemporary versus historical events. Our research approach is a case study. 
Yin also distinguishes between explanatory, descriptive or exploratory case 
studies. The differences between them are driven by the following research 
questions: who, what, how and why. Our case study is explanatory because it 
“deals with operational links needing to be traced over time rather than mere 
frequencies or incidence” (Yin, 1994:6). In other words, this case study intends 
to provide an understanding of why Co-op failed. In order to explain the 
phenomenon, we have included some descriptive elements in the form of tables 
1 to 4, appendices 1 to 3 and standard financial measures (ratios – table 5) as 
well. 
 
2.4  Data Collection 
 
To facilitate the study of a particular case, one has to identify its members and 
content within the sampling frame. One must explain how to identify the 
theoretical framework, state the problem and purpose and select a sample in the 
study. These tasks must be completed before the collection of the study data. A 
selection of samples is first done at the case level, followed by a sample 
selection within the case. Additionally, criteria must be established to guide this 
process on both levels of sampling (Yin, 1994). We used various means of data 
collection, which we have described here. A compelling and a good quality 
case study, as our research, can be done by using the facilities of a well-
equipped library and the telephone (Yin, 1994:11). Accordingly we used many 
resources from different libraries in Sweden in addition to Gothenburg 
University Library. We used documentary evidence in the form of published 
reports, government publications, and other documents and information in the 
public domain. We also made contacts with persons who are knowledgeable 
resources. Throughout, we applied both qualitative and quantitative methods in 
collecting and processing data for the research. 
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Our selected sample is Co-op. We began with the gathering of relevant 
information about Co-op. To gain a pre-understanding of the situation of Co-
op, we collected a substantial body of internal materials, such as documentary 
materials and archival records on Co-op. To deepen our understanding, we 
collected data from different books and made telephone enquiries; e-mail 
contacts and complemented these with other relevant resources. More 
importantly, we used Yin’s (1994) approach on how to do a case study. 
 
2.4.1  Literature Review 
 
The following are some of the Causes of Bank Failure as given in the existing 
literature. We also list references for further descriptions of these causes. 
 
Deteriorating Economic Factors: Eisenbeis (1986, cited by Hooks, 1994), 
Goodhart et al. (1998) and Hooks (1994). 
 
Regulation of Banks: Hempel & Simonson (1999), Goodhart et al. (1998), 
Spollen (1997), Llewellyn (1996, cited by Goodhart et al., 1998) and White 
(1984, cited by Hooks, 1994). 
 
Government Deposit Insurance Scheme: Goodhart et al. (1998), Hooks 
(1994), Kareken (1981, 1983, cited by Hooks, 1994), Kareken & Wallace 
(1978, cited by Hooks, 1994), White (1993) and Palubinskas & Stough (1999). 
 
Regulation as Regards Putting a Ceiling on Deposit Interest Rates: Selgin 
(1996) and Dothan & Williams (1980, cited by Hooks, 1994). 
 
Prohibition of Banks from Establishing Branches and Limiting Bank 
Investments: Hempel & Simonson (1999), Hooks (1994), Goodhart et al. 
(1998), White (1986, cited by Elgin, 1996), O’Driscoll (1988, cited by Hooks, 
1994) and Selgin (1996). 
 
Capital Requirements: Polizatto (year not given) and Goodhart et al. (1998). 
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Inadequate Reserve Requirements: Ghanaweb site (year not given), White 
(1999) and Friedman (1960, cited by Hooks, 1994). 
 
Forbearance: Hempel & Simonson (1999) and White (1993). 
 
Lender of Last Resort: Selgin (1996) and White (1999). 
 
Mismanagement: Goodhart et al. (1998), Heffernan (1996), Pantalone & Platt 
(1987, cited by Hooks, 1994), Spollen (1997), White (1993), Palubinskas & 
Stough (1999) and Spiegel, et al. (1996). 
 
Fraud and Corruption: Heffernan (1996), Fitchett (1996), Smith & Walter 
(1997) and White (1993). 
 
Poor Risk Management Procedures such as Lending Practices of Banks: 
Hempel & Simonson (1999), Palubinskas & Stough (1999), Goodhart et al. 
(1998), Chimerine (1998), Polizatto (year not given), White (1993), Spollen 
(1997) and Kindleberger (1989, cited by Hooks, 1994). 
 
Deregulation of Banks: Hooks (1994), Chu (1996) and Kareken (1981, 1983, 
cited by Hooks, 1994). 
 
Political Interference: Goodhart et al. (1998) and Caprio & Honohan (1999). 
 
 
Yin (1994: 108-109) recommends rival explanations as one of the patterns for 
analyzing case studies. This strategy has been used in the study. 
 
Competing (Rival) Theories on Some Causes of Bank Failure are presented 
below. Again, we list references for further descriptions. 
 
Regulation of Banks: Goodhart et al. (1998), Chu (1996), Kareken (1981, 
1983, cited by Hooks, 1994), Howells (2000), Kindleberger (1989, cited by 
Hooks, 1994), Hooks (1994), O’Driscoll (1988, cited by Hooks 1994), 
Eisenbeis (1986, cited by Hooks, 1994) and Dothan & Williams (1980, cited by 
Hooks, 1994). 
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Deposit Insurance Scheme: Eisenbeis (1986, cited by Hooks, 1994), Kareken 
& Wallace (1978, cited by Hooks, 1994) and Helfer (1999). 
 
Government Deposit Insurance Scheme: Friedman (1960, cited by Hooks, 
1994) and Kaufman (1996). 
 
Deposit Insurance Scheme by Banks: Palubinskas & Stough (1999). 
 
Direct Supervision of Banks: Hempel & Simonson (1999), Hooks (1994), 
Goodhart et al. (1998), Polizatto (year not given) and Spiegel, et al. (1996). 
 
Capital Requirements: Palubinskas & Stough (1999), Goodhart et al. (1998) 
and Polizatto (year not given). 
 
Capital Adequacy Rules: Kaufman (1996), Dothan & Williams (1980, cited 
by Hooks, 1994), Eatwell (2000), Howells & Bain (2000), Kareken & Wallace 
(1978, cited by Hooks, 1994). 
 
Forbearance: Eisenbeis & Horvitz (1994, cited by Goodhart et al., 1998). 
 
Establishing Branches and Limiting Bank Investments: Benston & 
Kaufman (1996 cited by Kaufman, 1996), Hooks (1994) and Howells & Bain 
(2000). 
 
Ceiling on Deposit Interest Rates: Kareken & Wallace (1978, cited by Hooks, 
1994) and Dothan & Williams (1980, cited by Hooks, 1994). 
 
Lender of Last Resort: Hooks (1994), Smith & Walter (1997) and 
Kindleberger (1989, cited by Hooks, 1994). 
 
Management: Spollen (1997) and Goodhart et al. (1998). 
 
Credit Risk Management: Goodhart et al. (1998). 
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Credit Philosophy and Culture: Hempel & Simonson (1999) and Spiegel et 
al. (1996). 
 
Data System: Kinsey (1998), Spiegel et al. (1996) and Essinger (1999). 
 
Deregulation of Banks: Eisenbeis (1986, cited by Hooks, 1994) and 
O’Driscoll (1988, cited by Hooks, 1994). 
 
2.4.2  Time Frame 
 
For the purpose of the case study of Co-op, we limited ourselves to the period 
from 1994 to 1999/2000 because we could not get the data for earlier periods. 
Notwithstanding this, we were able to critically analyze and review the data 
and information, as well as draw a conclusion and make recommendations on 
Co-op’s failure. 
 
2.5  Research Evaluation 
 
A research design shows a rational set of statements that helps with the 
evaluation of the worth of any given research. Validity tests are usually used to 
judge the quality of any empirical research work. Since a case study is one of 
the forms of such empirical studies, validity tests are relevant to a case study 
research. Such tests are construct validity, internal validity, external validity 
and reliability (Yin, 1994: 32-38). We applied the four tests in our study by 
analyzing and reviewing enough information on some causes of bank failure 
using Co-op as a case study to arrive at the empirical results. Then we 
compared the results of the case study with the existing theories. Additionally, 
competing (rival) explanations strategy was used in the analysis. 
 
2.5.1  Validity 
 
Validity is the extent to which a research correctly reveals or measures the 
particular theory that the researcher is trying to determine. It aims at the study’s 
achievement at assessing what the researcher determined to assess 
(writing.colostate.edu). It concerns whether there is a correct relationship 
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between theories and empirical findings (construct validity), whether the results 
of the research are in accordance with the reality (internal validity), and 
whether the findings can be generalized and can provide conclusions regarding 
other situations than the specific case studied (external validity) (Yin, 1994: 32-
38). 
2.5.2  Construct Validity 
 
To appreciate if a study has construct validity, the theoretical connections must 
be made; the empirical connection to the theory must be examined; the 
empirical proof must be interpreted as to how it agrees with the theoretical 
concept in terms of the particular procedures followed in the study. Construct 
validity addresses convergent and discriminate validity. The former is the 
common agreement among concepts collected independently of one another, 
which should theoretically agree with each other. The latter shows no 
relationship among concepts, which should not theoretically agree with each 
other (writing.colostate.edu). 
 
In the study of the existing theories on some causes of bank failure, we showed 
construct validity by proving that concepts that are theoretically supposed to be 
highly interconnected are, in practice, highly interconnected and those that are 
theoretically supposed to be unrelated are, in practice, unrelated. We compared 
our findings on why Co-op failed with the existing theories on some causes of 
bank failure. We used many evidential sources, showed a series of proofs and 
had a reliable person reassess the draft of the case study report (Yin, 1994 and 
Trochim, 2002). 
 
2.5.3  Internal Validity 
 
A study is internally valid to the extent that its results can be well linked to the 
cause, instead of irrelevant reasons (Cobb, 2002). It is an issue of which way 
the results match reality. A researcher will deduce that an incident originated 
from a previous occasion based on written data gathered as a component of the 
case study. To deal with this, the research design should attempt to answer the 
following questions: Is the data corroborative, and does it appear to be 
conclusive? Is the deduction right? Have all the opposing accounts and 
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viewpoints been regarded? (Yin, 1994: 35). Internal validity shows the 
thoroughness with which the research was done (e.g., the research design, the 
concern attached to measurements and approaches about what was and was not 
covered) and the degree the researcher takes into considering various 
descriptions and explanations for any contributory connections he explores. 
 
The research aimed at studying some causes of bank failure by means of a case 
study of Co-op. Internal validity addresses face and content validity. Face 
validity is about how a concept or process appears. Relevant questions to ask 
are: Is the research design appropriate and reliable? Are the methods for 
collecting data reasonable? To meet face validity, realistic data collection 
methods were chosen considering their cost-benefits implications. The research 
was also designed as advised by Yin (1994: 32-38). Content validity depends 
on the degree to which a study is related to a particular theory 
(writing.colostate.edu). A wide range of the content of the theories on some 
causes of bank failure was analyzed and the causes of Co-op failure were 
compared with many different literature sources. Conclusions were drawn from 
them to gain content validity. 
 
2.5.4  External Validity 
 
External validity has to do with the possibility for generalizing the results of the 
empirical study. The purpose of many researchers is to generalize their results 
to a number of issues and circumstances that are not part of the research. To the 
degree that the empirical findings can be generalized to various subjects, 
locations and researchers, the study has external validity. In particular, in what 
ways are the results able to be generalized, or measurable to other surroundings 
or to other individuals? To the extent that the results of the study would cause 
the same effect in another setting, the research is judged externally valid (Cobb, 
2002 and writing.colostate.edu). 
 
To achieve external validity, any researcher could apply the results of this 
research to any other bank in the developing countries, especially many state 
and quasi-state banks in Africa. This is because given the same factors that 
caused Co-op to fail, any bank that operates under similar conditions could fail. 
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2.5.5  Reliability 
 
Reliability aims at the truthfulness of the real measuring mechanism or process 
(writing.colostate.edu). Reliability is the consistency at which a test measures 
something. For instance, if one undertook the same research over and over 
(theoretically), would the study yield the same result at each trial? (Cobb, 
2002). In other words, reliability deals with the issue of the degree to which the 
investigation would give the same results if repeated. Also, if a different 
researcher made the same case study all over again, he should have the same 
results (Yin, 1994). Reliability is the degree to which a test gives the same 
results when the test is repeated several times. Independent researchers must be 
able to get consistent results given the same study procedures. This enhances 
the drawing of a conclusion to studies and the formulation of theories. 
Reliability of a research is important for its generalizability 
(writing.colostate.edu). To ensure reliability, the procedures followed in the 
case study were documented. This approach will enable any investigator 
applying the same procedures in performing the same case study to obtain 
similar findings and conclusions. 
 
2.5.6  Relevance 
 
The importance of the research question stems from the fact that bank failures 
adversely affect economies worldwide. In addition, the problem of why Co-op 
failed has not been previously researched. If the findings of this research 
enhance the prevention or elimination of bank failures, economies will be 
healthier for all stakeholders. 
 
In conclusion, chapter two provides the research design of the thesis. It shows 
the methods used to resolve the problem which include the study of different 
literatures on some causes of bank failure, an empirical study on Co-op, and an 
analysis of the theories against the actual causes of the failure of Co-op. 
Qualitative and quantitative methods are used in collecting and processing data 
for the research. A literature review of some of the Causes of Bank Failure 
together with Competing (Rival) theories is given. We applied the four validity 
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tests (construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability) to 
help with the evaluation of the worth of the research. 
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3.  THEORIES ON CAUSES OF BANK FAILURE 
 
This chapter analyzes and reviews the theories on some of the factors behind 
banking crisis. It is useful for all stakeholders (e.g. managers, depositors, 
borrowers and regulators) in the financial sector to know what causes a bank 
failure in order to help prevent the failure. The issue especially concerns 
managers and external regulators. This is because most managers are 
dismissed and regulators are blamed when banks fail. It is also very important 
for other stakeholders to understand the causes of bank failure, in order for 
them to help to avoid it. This is because the cost of a banking crisis to all 
stakeholders, especially to depositors, can be very high. 
 
The social costs of the failure of a bank can be higher than the costs incurred 
by the failed institution. Also, the consumer can lose when an institution fails, 
even if there is no systemic impact. This section, therefore, attempts to analyze 
and review some of the various theories on some of the factors behind banking 
crisis. 
 
3.1  Deteriorating Economic Factors 
 
Hooks (1994: 5) points out that deteriorating local economic conditions (e.g. 
inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates) cause bank failure. Eisenbeis 
(1986, cited by Hooks, 1994: 10) adds that macroeconomic factors (e.g. sudden 
adverse movements in a country’s terms of trade and sharp fluctuations in 
world interest rates, real exchange rates and inflation rates) worsened by 
regulations that are imposed on banks result in a bank failure. Like Hooks and 
Eisenbeis, Goodhart et al. (1998: 47) emphasize that interest rate fluctuations 
contribute to banking crisis. 
 
3.2  Regulation of Banks 
 
O’Driscoll (1988, cited by Hooks 1994: 9), Eisenbeis (1986, cited by Hooks, 
1994: 10), Dothan & Williams (1980, cited by Hooks, 1994: 36) share the 
opinion that government intervention causes bank distress. 
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Hempel & Simonson (1999: 17) state that when governments intervene in 
saving banks from failing, creditors and customers tend to rely on the 
government to protect their interests. The intervention, however, is a 
disincentive for other institutions, creditors and customers to effectively 
monitor their interests in banks in an independent way. Llewellyn (1996, cited 
by Goodhart et al., 1998: 2-3) notes the following situations, which could cause 
a bank failure: (i) Too many stringent rules could cause banks to disregard the 
measures as they may be seen by the banking sector as superfluous. (ii) Some 
dangers that banks are exposed to may be too difficult to be addressed by 
general laws. (iii) A rigid system of rules could inhibit banks from selecting the 
most efficient means of achieving regulatory goals set for them and may serve 
as a disincentive for improvement. 
 
While Spollen (1997: 28) concludes that ineffective regulatory system causes 
bank failure, White (1984, cited by Hooks, 1994:3, 36) also notes that 
government regulation is neither needed nor advantageous. 
 
3.2.1  Government Deposit Insurance Scheme 
 
Goodhart et al. (1998: 45) observe that in the absence of any measure to rescue 
distressed banks, they could be exposed to depositors’ runs. However, when 
complete deposit insurance schemes and other rescue measures are in place, 
stakeholders other than banks are discouraged from controlling the activities of 
intermediaries. This is why regulators protect the interest of the public by 
encouraging the reduction of risk-seeking behaviors. Kareken (1981, 1983, 
cited by Hooks, 1994: 3) and Kareken & Wallace (1978, cited by Hooks, 1994) 
state that a fixed-rate deposit insurance motivates banks to engage in risky 
investment activities. 
 
Hooks (1994: 39) agrees with the above by stating that a flat-rate fee deposit 
insurance is an incentive for banks to make risky investments. Palubinskas & 
Stough (1999) stress that the scheme results in unpaid loans, since banks and 
customers have nothing at stake when deposits are badly managed or lost 
through fraudulent actions. White (1993: 108-109) concludes that a 
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government deposit insurance scheme encourages unskilled management and 
fraudsters, irrespective of the regulation. 
 
3.2.2  Regulation as Regards Putting a Ceiling on Deposit Interest Rates 
 
Selgin (1996: 211) states that the purpose of putting a ceiling on deposit 
interest rates is to prevent banks from mobilizing deposits by giving borrowers 
big amounts of funds with high interest income to the bank. Dothan & 
Williams (1980, cited by Hooks, 1994: 36) state that a limit on deposit interest 
rates motivates banks to make risky investments. Additionally, banks often try 
to overrule the ceiling by rendering more services to depositors, which results 
in higher transaction costs and lower income. Selgin (1996: 211) concludes that 
instead of decreasing the prospects of bank failures, the ceiling reduces a 
bank’s capability to mobilize funds when it becomes illiquid. A ceiling on 
deposit and loan interest rates, therefore, it is argued, can cause bank failure. 
 
3.2.3  Prohibition of Banks from Establishing Branches and Limiting Bank 
Investments 
 
Selgin (1996: 200) states that geographical limitations pose significant threats 
to banks. Additionally, such limitations result in the following situations, which 
may cause bank failure: a bank’s vulnerability to different threats is raised; 
systemic risk is encouraged and private market forces are hindered from 
preventing failures. Hooks (1994: 8, 49-50) observes that branching restrictions 
could constrain banks from spreading their investment activities in different 
locations. These geographic restrictions, coupled with prohibition from 
investments, result in unsuccessful diversification by banks. Hooks also notes 
that limiting a bank’s investment chances could lower its diversification 
operations. Goodhart et al. (1998: 38) add that lack of appropriate 
diversification causes bank failure. Hempel & Simonson (1999: 18) argue that 
without branches, banks cannot mobilize substantial amounts of stable retail 
deposits. Such a position compels banks to rely extensively on unstable funding 
bases attracted from money market creditors. O’Driscoll (1988, cited by Hooks, 
1994: 9) observes that banks may use flexible investment freedom to focus on 
limited higher-risk categories. 
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Selgin (1996: 210) adds that even though the justification of geographical 
limitation is to stop banks from excessive clustering and avoid competition, this 
perception misinterprets the impact of bank branching and the importance of 
competition. White (1986, cited by Selgin, 1996: 209) states that branching 
limitation raises a bank’s vulnerability to risks for its liabilities as well as its 
assets. In the same way that branching restrictions rules have motivated banks 
to high risk-taking investments, some regulations have also constrained banks 
from engaging in many different banking operations. 
 
Selgin (1996: 208) concludes that regulation in respect of branching limitation 
contributes to the possibility of banks failing, by constraining their chances to 
prevent risk and by supporting bank risky operations. To him, the worst 
regulation is branching restriction. 
 
3.2.4  Capital Requirements 
 
The lower a bank’s capital, the higher the probability of its failure (Polizatto, 
year not given). Goodhart et al. (1998: xvii, 49, 57) agree with this statement 
and add that as a bank’s capital decreases, the higher its motivation for actions 
towards survival. This leads to more dangerous risk-taking operations. 
Therefore, the risk of failure rises with the decline of equity. Palubinskas & 
Stough (1999) also observe that one of the measures used to stop the increase 
of bank crisis is to increase the ceiling as regards capital held by banks. This 
requirement compels banks to hold much capital, or combine their businesses 
with other banks, or forfeit their licenses. According to Polizatto (year not 
given) capital is essential to cushion losses incurred by banks. When banks 
have inadequate capital, they usually conceal the situation for fear of exposing 
the illiquidity. If stakeholders such as bank management and regulators do not 
effectively address a capital erosion situation early, it could result in 
bankruptcy. A similar view as the above has been expressed by Goodhart et al. 
(1998: 57) who state that adequate funds reduce risk-taking while insufficient 
capital motivates banks to engage in actions towards survival at all costs. 
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3.2.5  Inadequate Reserve Requirements 
 
A reserve requirement is a portion of cash to total deposits which banks are 
obliged to maintain. This ensures prudential and fiscal control of the activities 
of banks (www.bog.gov.gh). White (1999) adds that a government obliges 
banks to reserve the funds in order to improve the actual need for base money. 
Friedman (1960, cited by Hooks, 1994: 37) states that bank failures arise 
because banks do not keep all their deposits in statutory reserve funds. 
 
3.2.6  Forbearance 
 
Hempel & Simonson (1999: 18) note that some regulatory bodies exercise 
forbearance. This contributes to bank crisis by permitting distressed banks to 
continue their operations instead of liquidating them. This action aims at 
assisting banks to make profits. Its effect is rather disadvantageous to banks 
because usually when banks lack adequate funds, and remain in operation, their 
capital situation deteriorates (Hempel & Simonson, 1999: 18). 
 
3.2.7  Lender of Last Resort 
 
Selgin (1996: 214) and White (1999: 74-77) state that governments use the 
lender of last resort mechanism to help some stakeholders of banks which are 
failing. When bank failures rise, any money reserved to deal with the situation 
decreases. The only option then is to either replenish the reserves or combine 
the operations of distressed banks. However, if prospective beneficiaries of this 
approach perceive that the central bank may intervene when every bank fails, 
the measure could rather encourage banks to engage in more risky activities. 
 
3.3  Mismanagement 
 
Management is a key to a successful business. Mismanagement caused many 
banks to fail in the 1980s and early 1990s. Banking crisis mostly comes from 
the absence of good managerial ideas in management decision-making. 
Therefore, competence and focus play a major role in banking (Spiegel, et al. 
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1996: 51). According to Pantalone & Platt (1987, cited by Hooks, 1994: 41-
42), mismanagement, especially excessive risk-taking, is the main cause of 
bank failure. On the other hand, White (1993: 110) notes that even though 
bankers are accused of misconduct, it is difficult to prove that the negligence of 
management is the only cause of bank failure. 
 
Spollen (1997: 25-26, 32, 51) has, however, listed the following as underlying 
the failure of businesses which, to us, are also relevant to the purpose of this 
study: 
 
• Inability of management to appreciate and control a business. 
• Inability of management to ensure compliance with laid down 
procedures. In many situations where there is a loss of a business, the 
failure is attributed to either lack of policies, and if policies existed at all, 
they are inadequate or existing policies are not observed. 
• Insufficient number of staff, particularly middle management, which can 
subject a small number of employees to over-time work, which could 
eventually result in the failure of a bank. The issue is whether an 
organization has adequate staff complement and whether it appreciates 
their interests and addresses them (Spollen 1997: 86, 94). 
• The situation when fundamental control procedures are ignored. 
• The situation when internal audit does not play its role in the formulation 
of a board of directors’ policy and its procedures. 
• The situation when the board of directors does not effectively address 
audit queries. 
• Over-reliance on one member of staff. Most of the time organizations are 
defrauded by some of their own workers, mostly those who have been 
with organizations for long periods of time and whose work is not 
supervised. Excessive authority is given to an employee because he 
seems to be very effective on his schedule. Individuals in this category 
are trusted, devoted to duty and work extra hours under the guise of 
showing much commitment Spollen (1997: 20, 34-36, 90-91). Like 
Spollen, Heffernan (1996: 282-288) states a practical case of such a 
situation that contributed to the failure of Barings Bank. 
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Goodhart et al. (1998: 49) add that if worker compensation is tied to 
performance and output is below expectation, the managers could manipulate 
the output for fear of being dismissed. This risk behavior could eventually 
cause a bank to fail (e.g., Barings Bank failure). 
 
Palubinskas & Stough (1999) state that a shortage of competent bankers as 
regards loans’ risk appraisal, scrutiny of financial information of customers, 
appraisal of cash flow, or calculation of fundamental profitability, contributes 
to many of the loan defaults. They continue saying that lack of skills leads to a 
situation where there is no credit evaluation - where bankers only enforce and 
supervise the credit manual, which is not updated to reflect varying periods. 
Goodhart et al. (1998: 38) agree with this perception. White (1993: 110) notes 
that currently it is not easy for banks to attract skilled managers. 
 
3.3.1  Fraud and Corruption 
 
Smith & Walter (1997: 157) and Fitchett (1996) state that fraud causes banks to 
fail as happened in the case of Banco Ambrosiano, BCCI, Crédit Lyonnais and 
Herstatt. Heffernan (1996: 293) adds that corruption and fraud have been the 
general causes of many failed banks. 
 
White (1993: 108-109) argues that bank failures are seen by many to be caused 
by mismanagement, fraud and deregulation. However, fraud is not the primary 
cause of banking crisis, since according to White, bank failures were rampant 
in the 1930s when there was no fraud. 
 
3.3.2  Poor Risk Management Procedures Such as Lending Practices of 
Banks 
 
Hempel & Simonson (1999: 388) state that the main activity of bank 
management is not deposit mobilization and giving credit. Effective credit 
administration reduces the risk of customer default. The competitive advantage 
of a bank is dependent on its capability to handle credit risk valuably. Bad 
loans cause bank failure. Palubinskas & Stough (1999) note that the failure of a 
bank is mainly seen as a result of mismanagement because of bad lending 
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decisions made with respect to wrong appraisal of credit status, or the 
repayment of non-performing credits and excessive focus on giving loans to 
certain customers. Goodhart et al. (1998: xvii, 38) also state that poor credit 
control, which results in undue credit risk, causes bank failure. Chimerine 
(1998) adds that a bad lending tradition leads to a large portfolio of unpaid 
loans. This results in insolvency of banks and reduces funds available for fresh 
advances, which eventually causes a financial crisis. Goodhart et al. (1998: 
xvii, 38) add connected lending to the causes of bank failure. 
 
Again, Palubinskas & Stough (1999) note that lack of dependable financial 
information on borrowers to help in assessing creditworthiness causes a bank 
failure. Yet mismanagement is not a result of immaturity all the time. Most of 
the time, principals and agents know that major faults in the banking regulation 
in respect of internal changes permit them to exploit a bank’s funds. Sometimes 
these two groups of stakeholders attempt to accomplish their short term 
earnings objectives by acquiring high risks in the bank. Polizatto (year not 
given) points out that financial information disclosed by banks is often false. 
He explains that the absence of existing and adequate financial data underlies 
the keeping of security based credit because bankers are unable to assess 
creditworthiness. Goodhart et al. (1998: 49) state that re-stating financial 
earnings from previous years to current years could lead to the falsity of 
financial information of banks. 
 
Polizatto again observes that in many cases asymmetric information exists 
between banks and investors. Goodhart et al. (1998: 13-14, 46) also add that 
the common problem of prudential rules is the asymmetric information issue 
between the customer and the bank. Heffernan (1996: 2, 22) adds that bank 
structures generate asymmetric information leading to moral hazard and 
adverse selection. These writers further state that organizations give extended 
agreements whose worth to the customer is based on the organization’s 
attitudes and performance subsequent to the date of the agreement. The 
problem and rigidity of rules are because every stakeholder (e.g. government, 
bank, depositor and borrower) has dissimilar information, incentives and 
positions. For instance, how can savers or the government discern the risk 
actions of banks? If the authorities could monitor the total risks of an 
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intermediary inadequately, is it feasible to initiate laws that minimize runs on 
banks? 
 
Spollen (1997: 9, 30, 58-60) states that irregular meetings of loans committees, 
false loans, large treasury losses, high sums of unrecorded deposits and money 
laundering in large amounts, contribute to bank failure. He adds that some 
lending decisions involving high amounts of money are made by an individual 
worker because of the status of the recipients of the loans. 
 
Kindleberger (1989, cited by Hooks, 1994: 37-38) observes that over-
investment is directly related to high risk-taking and this causes bank failure. 
Additionally, some employees disregard laid down procedures and rather work 
according to instructions from certain areas. In some cases a worker of a Credit 
Department of a bank obtains signatures from every member of the loan 
committee in irregular ways sanctioning a loan. Hempel & Simonson (1999: 
16-17) mention loans to the “energy producers and commercial real estate 
developers” as examples of risky investments, especially when the economy is 
good and the lending decision is based on improper projection. White (1993: 
12) adds that the failure of banks is mainly due to risky credits they give. 
Hempel & Simonson (1999: 390) conclude that all banks incur certain loan 
losses when some borrowers default in repaying their loans. Irrespective of the 
extent of the risk involved, good credit management can reduce the default. 
 
3.4  Deregulation of Banks 
 
Hooks (1994: 3-4) states that deregulation results in higher risk-taking by banks 
and could lead to bank failure. Chu (1996) emphasizes that free banking 
encourages banks to engage in deceptive operations and over-expansion, which 
makes banks fail. With respect to deposit insurance schemes, Kareken (1981, 
1983, cited by Hooks, 1994) notes that deregulation is unsafe for banks. He 
explains that when banks have freedom of investment and diversification, the 
situation leads to higher risk-taking. Like Kareken, Hooks (1994: 49) adds that 
if regulatory authorities eliminate the application of strict maximum deposit 
interest rates imposed on banks, resulting in the increase of deposit interest 
rates, banks will engage in high risk investments. He therefore concludes that 
deregulation results in more risky investments. 
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3.5  Political Interference 
 
Goodhart et al. (1998: 38) point out that politically directed lending leads to 
banking crisis. To buttress this assertion, Caprio & Honohan (1999) observe 
that governments can cause banks to fail in many ways. Some dishonest leaders 
exploit the funds of banks as happened in the Philippines in the 1980s. In most 
cases, governments influenced banks to give loans to certain borrowers that 
discouraged banks from properly assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers 
and eventually destabilized banks’ financial standing. The implication of this is 
that such loans are not paid off. Occasionally, the credits are given to 
government suppliers leading to the failure of the banks involved. 
 
In conclusion, chapter three has analyzed and reviewed the theories on some of 
the factors behind banking crisis. In agreement with Yin (1994: 38), it has 
indicated understandable theories and the conditions within which the theories 
are considered to cause bank failure. Many different authors have given 
different variables that contribute to banking crisis. 
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4.  OVERVIEW OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY 
 
In order to understand the thesis, it is useful to have an understanding of the 
Ghanaian economy as well as the Ghanaian financial system and difficulties. 
The figures in this chapter are shown in U.S. dollars in some places, Ghanaian 
monetary unit (the cedi, ø) as well as in pound sterling in other places. It was 
not possible to know why these different monetary units were used. 
 
4. 1  Economy in Brief 
 
Economic policy is very successful in ensuring price solidity together with 
effective banking sector and other economic groups (Acquah, 2002). 
 
In 1983 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) established the Economic 
Recovery Programme (ERP) in Ghana. A Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP) was also set up towards economic order. Financial Sector Adjustment 
Programme (FINSAP) was established in 1987 to boost the success of the 
structural adjustment programme. This was necessary because mismagement 
and political interference in the operations of banks had caused many banks to 
fail (www.bog.gov.gh). The FINSAP project was funded by the World Bank 
with the aim to improve banking regulation and reinforce banking supervision; 
reorganize banks which were failing by giving them funds and skilled 
management; enhance resource acquisition and raise the competence of loans 
management by the banking sector (www.winne.com). 
 
Changes made in the exchange rate policy resulted in much depreciation of the 
cedi. This rendered many of the foreign currency credits of commercial banks 
bad. With a World Bank assisted loan, the banking system was reorganized and 
delinquent loans were taken over by government. A Non-performing Asset 
Recovery Trust (NPART) was given the task of recovering these loans. 
Management of the affected banks was restructured and some of the banks 
were computerized. The government divested its shares in some banks. The 
entry requirements into the banking sector were made more flexible. The 
Government borrowed funds from the banks to cover its deficit because there 
were no government securities (www.bog.gov.gh). 
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The Ghana Government launched an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 
April 1983. The aim of the programme was to resolve the numerous economic 
problems Ghana was encountering. Free economic rules were launched. The 
direct monetary control was changed into a free monetary system in stages 
which started with the establishment of a market-based scheme of monetary 
control by 1992 (www.winne.com). 
 
In 1998 the worldwide financial problem that started from East Asia negatively 
affected several developing economies. The impact of the crisis resulted in the 
deterioration of some of these economies and this increased the avoidance of 
risk-taking by the international financial markets. Proposals to forestall the 
dangers that big private funds which flow worldwide were exposed to included 
the necessity for wide-ranging policies with changeable macroeconomic rules, 
stricter economic laws, proper limitations on funds movements, and the 
application of strong rescue mechanisms. Globally, Ghana kept a non-
interventionist trade and payments regime. Domestically, the El Nino situation 
activated a shortage of energy crisis, as the reduced global economic 
transactions unfavorably impacted on international prices of Ghana’s two main 
export commodities – gold and timber (Peprah, 1999). 
 
Benoni & Osei (2001) add that the exogenous3 impact from the Asian crisis, the 
depression in Japan, declining global prices of gold and cocoa and the sharp 
increase in petroleum prices, the high level of domestic crime such as 
corruption and fraud coupled with the breakdown of systems, macroeconomic 
factors (inflation, exchange rate depreciation, fiscal deficit and rising monetary 
growth) as well as international trade and payment problems have adversely 
affected the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Ghana. 
 
According to Investek Consultancy Services Limited (year not given), from the 
1970s to the beginning of the 1980s the economy of Ghana weakened. This 
was due to wrong policies and unfavorable conditions such as high oil prices 
and drought. This led to a constant fall in real GDP at a yearly average rate of 
0,3% from 1970 to 1980. As of 1982 the economy faced increased inflation, 
huge budget deficits and downward growth rates. In 1983 inflation was 12,3%, 
                                          
3 Exogenous: Originating from outside; derived externally. 
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increased to 25% in 1986 and reduced to 18% in 1991. GDP growth rate 
declined to 3,9% and growth in money supply rose from 20% in 1991 to about 
53% in 1992. The country has experienced consistent financial indiscipline. In 
1995, there was a budget deficit of 0,3%. As of end of 1995 inflation was 71%. 
As of 1996 the budget deficit was 10,4% of GDP. 
 
Ghana’s main economic occupation is agriculture, which provides about 36% 
of GDP, offering employment to approximately 60% of Ghanaians. It has 
arable land, forests, diamonds, gold, manganese and bauxite. In 2000 Ghana’s 
GDP was U.S.$ 5,2 billion. Around 25%, 6% and 30% of GDP was earned 
from industry, mining and services, respectively; agriculture increased by 2,1% 
(www.fao.org). The real GDP growth of 5,1% in 1997 resulted from a 
significant increase in the following sectors – service: 6,2%; industry: 5,7%; 
and agriculture: 3,3%. The year-end inflation rate was 20,8% as against a target 
of 15%. The cedi weakened by 22,7% in 1997 while money supply increased 
by 39,5% in the year compared with 39,4% increase in 1996 
(www.ghanaweb.com). 
 
In September 1998 the discount rate for the first time since September 1995, 
was reduced from 45% to 42%. Inflation fell from 71% in 1995 to 33% in 
1996, fell to 27% in November 1997 and reduced to 16,2% in November 1998. 
The three-month Treasury bill rate moved from 43 % to 26,8% by the end of 
the year. The currency depreciated against the dollar by 27% in 1995, 17% in 
1996, and 23% in 1997. At the beginning of 1998 the cedi was about 2,260 to 
the U.S.dollar and 2,325 as of September, 1998 (www.ghanaweb.com). 
 
In 2000 exports amounted to U.S.$ 1,861 million, while imports were U.S.$ 
2,833 million, resulting in a trade deficit of about U.S.$ 1,0 billion. The terms 
of trade weakened by about 30%, exposing Ghana to balance of payments 
problems. As of the end of 2000, the current account had a deficit of U.S.$ 457 
million, corresponding to 8,8% of GDP. This deteriorated Ghana's global 
reserves, which were U.S.$ 174 million in mid 2001, which was lower than a 
month’s worth of imports. Additionally, foreign direct investments and private 
capital flows gradually declined, keeping the nation reliant on global loans to 
meet its financial obligations. The country’s foreign liability grew from U.S.$ 
1,4 billion in 1980 to U.S.$ 6,9 billion in 1999. In 1999 and 2000 financial 
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policies led to a budget deficit of about 8,8% of GDP. The nominal financial 
difference improved to a shortfall of U.S.$ 216 million from April to June 2001 
after a shortfall of U.S.$ 1,030 million from October to December of 2000. 
Inflation rose from almost 15% as of January 2000 to about 40% as of 
December 2000 (www.fao.org). The cedi gradually devalued and lost 86% of 
its worth from 1993 to 2000. The absence of an adequate efficient financial 
industry made the application of high interest rates unproductive in controlling 
inflation due to a strong currency speculation (Buren, 2001). In 2000 inflation 
continued to rise from around 35% to 40% bracket throughout January to June 
2001. The cedi weakened by over 50% in 2000 but was comparatively stable in 
2001 (www.fao.org). 
 
4.1.1  Monetary and Fiscal Policies 
 
Before 1987 the major tool for monetary management used by Bank of Ghana 
were direct controls. The Bank exercised direct management over the monetary 
system of Ghana. This involved using direct instruments such as loans 
management, controlled interest rates and reserve obligations to manage the 
money supply. The controls included limitations on commercial bank loans to 
the private industry and rules on interest rates. Different limitations were set for 
individual banks and the banking industry as a whole. The limitations consisted 
of floors and ceilings for savings and borrowing interest rates. Government 
securities and securities markets were non-existent. The Government borrowed 
funds from banks and the central bank to cover its deficit. 
 
A securities market was formed. In 1986 a weekly public sale of treasury bills 
was instituted. In 1988 Bank of Ghana bills were launched to mop up surplus 
liquidity in the economy. Before then there had been measures to permit the 
Government to stop borrowing from banks. The Bank of Ghana bills enhanced 
the money market for banks by creating investment opportunities for them. The 
instruments included a 30-day-bill, 182-day-bill and 2-year-bill. A 3-5-year-
bond was introduced. Discount houses were also established. The aim was to 
ease the conveyance of monetary policies from Bank of Ghana to the banks. 
The discount houses were channels through which banks could lend and 
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borrow funds among themselves. Bank of Ghana focused on the market 
excesses and shortages. The direct credit control was unsuccessful  
 
Difficulties in the direct controls included huge credits from the banking sector 
to fund government budget deficits. Bank of Ghana’s strict credit control and 
high reserve requirements on banks rendered banks unable to give loans and 
also the policy constrained investment opportunities of banks. The banks, 
therefore, circumvented the rules by using unconventional ways to recover their 
losses. Among others, they set high fees for their non-traditional financial 
services, which usually increased their operational expenses. These and many 
other disadvantages of the direct monetary control mechanism called for key 
changes in the monetary control function. 
 
Changes were made in the economic rules to create a complete indirect fiscal 
management system. From 1983 to 1988 a foundation was laid for the 
establishment of a market-based structure of monetary rules. Monetary rules 
were made stronger. For example, interest rates and reserve requirements were 
increased. Bank of Ghana used indirect monetary control to manage money 
supply. Instruments the Central Bank used included Open Market Operations 
(OMO) which entails trading securities, Repurchase Agreements (Repos) and 
SWAPS. 
 
From 1988 to 1992 limitations on bank credits were eliminated. Since then 
banks have been free to set the amount and choose the type of borrowers to 
lend money to. Additionally, in 1987/88 ceilings on interest rates were 
removed, allowing banks to set their preferred interest rates on deposits and 
credits. Bank of Ghana however, establishes its lead rate, the Bank Rate which 
it uses for overdrafts to banks and for rediscounting financial instruments 
(www.winne.com)  
 
The central bank uses the primary auction of treasury and Bank of Ghana bills 
to execute monetary rules. In March 1996 it launched the wholesale auction 
system. Tenders were limited to primary dealers such as commercial banks, 
discount houses and brokerage firms with the aim of beginning a secondary 
market. The measure has not been effective because subscription of the 
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auctions is some times below expectation. Additionally the primary dealers do 
not encourage secondary market operation (www.bog.gov.gh).  
 
Reserve Requirements: Effective April 1997, Ghana’s reserve requirements 
included foreign currency deposits with the aim to discourage banks from 
selling only foreign currency deposits and refusing to sell local currency 
deposits. Starting from July 2000 a primary reserve requirement of 9% was on 
both domestic and foreign currency deposits; the secondary reserve 
requirement was 35% (www.winne.com). The ratio changed from 27% in 1990 
to 10% in 1996 and 8% from 1997 to 1999 (www.bog.gov.gh)  
 
According to the Investek Consultancy Services Limited (year not given), the 
financial crises Ghana faced in 1992 resulted in the growth of the money 
supply which increased by about 53% that year from 20% in 1991. In 1993 the 
growth in money supply slowed down to 27% and increased in 1995 resulting 
from much foreign exchange inflow to Ghana. The Central Bank increased the 
bank rate to 45%. The growth in money supply declined to 40% and local 
credit grew by a yearly average of 22,9% during 1992 and 1995. 
 
4.2  Overview of the Ghanaian Financial Sector 
 
4.2.1  Structure of the Financial Industry 
 
The Investek Consultancy Services Limited states that Ghana has formal and 
informal financial sectors. The informal sector comprises money lenders, 
numerous credit and “susu”4 organizations. There is a close relationship 
between the formal and informal financial sectors with respect to borrowing 
and lending activities. Many Ghanaian traders use the informal financial sector 
services in their transactions. Ghana’s formal financial system is composed of 
banking and non-banking divisions. 
 
The financial sector comprises the central bank (Bank of Ghana), eleven 
commercial banks, five merchant banks, over one hundred rural banks and non-
                                          
4 Susu: Informal lending and borrowing transactions organized by groups of people. 
Some Causes of Bank Failure – Overview of The Ghanaian Economy 
41 
bank financial institutions. The non-banking system includes the Ghana Stock 
Exchange, twenty-one insurance companies, the Social Security and National 
Insurance Trust (SSNIT), two discount.houses, the Home Finance Company, 
numerous building societies, a venture capital company, a unit trust and five 
leasing companies (strategis.ic.gc.ca). 
 
4.2.2  Bank of Ghana 
 
Ghana became independent from Great Britain in 1957. After its independence, 
it set up its central bank (Bank of Ghana) which replaced the West African 
Currency Board (WACB). The WACB issued money for Gold Coast and for 
other British colonies in West Africa - Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The 
Bank of Ghana decree (1957) authorizes the central bank with the following 
responsibilities: printing of currency, the Government’s banker and monetary 
representative, regulator of the financial sector and establishment of the 
structure for autonomous fiscal management (www.winne.com). 
 
Bank of Ghana supervises banks in Ghana. It has eliminated the grading of 
banks in Ghana into primary and secondary and categorized all of them as 
commercial banks. It is a lender of last resort for banks in Ghana. Bank of 
Ghana is responsible for the functioning and management of financial policy. It 
therefore ensures the effective running of the banking sector and the financial 
system in general. Additionally, it makes sure that banks address the interest of 
the public. The Bank of Ghana decree makes a distinction between domestic 
banking operations and foreign banking operations. A domestic banking 
operation is registered in Ghana with a minimum of 55% of its shares owned 
by Ghanaians (Investek Consultancy Services Limited, year not given). 
 
Bank of Ghana has a Banking Supervision Department and a Financial 
Institution (Non-Banking) Department. The departments inspect the operations 
of banks and other financial organizations to guarantee that they observe 
statutory rules. The most important goal of the central bank is to promote 
effective economic policies to ensure price solidity, in order to generate an 
attractive macroeconomic atmosphere, which supports the maintenance of 
economic stability. Fiscal control is a very vital traditional role of the central 
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bank. For this purpose, it uses many different mechanisms, positions and goals. 
It handles its most important function of monetary regulation together with the 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
In addition to regulating the activities of banks, Bank of Ghana concerns itself 
with the general economic growth process. It offers capital for setting up 
specialized and other financial organizations such as development and rural 
banks; guarantees loans to banks to protect credits to small-scale borrowers in 
agricultural and industrial industries; gives guarantees for agricultural produce, 
“markets bills discounted by commercial banks”; and takes part in the setting 
up of certain industrial and agricultural projects in the private system 
(www.winne.com). 
 
According to Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Report (2000), the required 
minimum paid-up capital for establishing a bank in Ghana is as listed below: 
 
• Domestic banking operations - a minimum of ø 5 billion. 
• Foreign banking operations - a minimum of ø 8 billion, with a 
minimum of 60%, which should be transferred to Ghana as 
convertible currency. 
• Development bank for medium or long-term finance of agriculture, 
trade or industry - a minimum of ø 10 billion. 
 
The least required paid-up capital for entering the financial sector is as follows: 
 
• Deposit taking institutions such as savings and loans - a minimum of 
ø 1 billion. 
• Non-deposit taking institutions including Leasing Companies - a 
minimum of ø 500 million. 
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4.3  Banking Regulations in Ghana 
 
4.3.1  Banking Law 1989 – Provisional National Defence Council 
(P.N.D.C.L. 225) 
 
The Banking Law was revised in 1989 to give effective prudential and 
regulatory foundation for the banking sector (www.winne.com). According to 
the Government of Ghana Gazette (1989) the Banking Law comprises the 
following main sections: 
 
PART 1 - Licensing of Banks. 
PART II - Statutory Obligations of Banks. 
PART III - Special Functions of the Bank of Ghana. 
PART IV - Appointments, Duties and Powers of the Head of Banking 
Supervision Department. 
PART V - Accounts and Audit. 
PART VI - Miscellaneous and Supplemental Provisions. 
First Schedule (Section 8) - Capital Adequacy. 
Second Schedule (Section 39) - Matters to be Included in the Long Form Audit 
Report. 
 
The law regulates the setting up of banks and their activities in Ghana (Investek 
Consultancy Services Limited, year not given). The banking law was revised in 
1989 to ensure effective prudential and regulatory supervision. 
4.3.2  The Bank of Ghana Law 1992 P.N.D.C. Law 291 
 
The Bank of Ghana Law was revised in 1992 to reinforce the regulatory and 
supervisory function of Bank of Ghana. (www.winne.com). 
 
4.3.3  The Financial Institutions (Non-Banking) Law of 1993 
 
In 1993 Financial Institutions (non-Banking Law) was passed to control 
operations of non-banking financial institutions (www.winne.com). 
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In summary, chapter four has given an overview of the Ghanaian economy. It 
has also looked at the financial and banking systems in Ghana. The financial 
sector is divided into formal and informal systems. Ghana’s formal financial 
system composes of the banking and the non-banking divisions. The banking 
system which is relatively recent, was inherited from the British system and 
was created by a country which had been held under colonial rule for a number 
of years. 
 
Ghana’s central bank (Bank of Ghana) replaced the West African Currency 
Board (WACB) after Ghana’s independence in 1957. The Bank of Ghana 
decree (1957) authorizes the central bank with the responsibility to print 
currency, be the Government’s banker and monetary representative, regulate 
the financial sector and supervise banks in Ghana, among others. The central 
bank is a lender of last resort for banks in Ghana. The banking law 1989 
P.N.D.C.L 225 gives effective prudential and regulatory foundation for the 
banking sector. The general purpose of the various banking laws is intended to 
safeguard assets and disclose relevant financial information. 
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5.  GHANA CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD. (CO-OP) 
 
This chapter develops the case study of Co-op as empirical implications of 
some causes of bank failure. In an attempt to answer the main research 
question stated in the introductory chapter - Why do banks fail in general and 
in particular why did Co-op fail?, a single-case (holistic) design was used. The 
advantage of the holistic methodology is that the case study itself is holistic. 
Yin (1994: 38, 42). Co-op was chosen for the case study because it symbolizes 
an important case in assessing well-prepared theories on causes of bank 
failure. 
 
Caprio & Klingebiel (1999) observe that banking distress in which a bank has 
a negative net worth can happen over many years and could continue for a 
long time before the bank eventually collapses. Co-op’s failure may have 
occurred over a long period. The study is, however, limited to the period from 
1994 to 1999/2000 due to unavailability of data for earlier periods. Co-op’s 
financial statements - profit and loss accounts and balance sheets (tables 2 & 
3) were used. The profit and loss statement for the year ended 1999/2000 was 
not available. Other evidential materials including books, newspapers and 
articles from the internet were used. No information was available to confirm 
Co-op as being a listed company. To ease the computation of some vital 
standard financial measures (ratios – table 5), the figures for 1993 were 
included. 
 
5.1  History of Co-op 
 
Co-op was founded in Ghana in 1974 by the Registrar of Co-operatives 
instituted by the Co-operative Societies Decree 1968 NLCD 252. It gained a 
limited liability company status in 1992. The owners of Co-op were the Ghana 
Government, the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), the 
State Insurance Company (SIC), Co-operative organizations and some 
individuals. It went into official liquidation on January 17, 2000. As of that 
date, it had 21 branches across Ghana and its staff complement was 415 
(Ghanaian Times, January 2000; an anonymous source, 2002). 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000) confirmed the liquidation of Co-op in its report 
for the First Creditors’ Meeting. It stated that on January 17, 2000, the 
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shareholders, in observation of Section 2 of the Bodies Corporate (Official 
Liquidations) Act enacted a special resolution for the liquidation. Accordingly, 
the Registrar published the resolution. In satisfaction of the Bodies Corporate 
(Official Liquidations) Act, the Registrar of Companies was given the mandate 
as Official Liquidator of Co-op. The Official Liquidator then gave power of 
attorney to PricewaterhouseCoopers to act on his behalf, regarding the 
responsibilities of the liquidation with the help of the Central Bank. 
 
The mission of Co-op was to offer complete commercial banking services and 
mobilize savings deposits. Its strategic plan was to transact business with 
institutions, satisfy customers and be competitive. Its objectives were “export 
financing, business advisory services, support services to co-operative societies 
and maintain adequate skilled staff” (an anonymous source, 2002). 
 
The following were the causes of Co-op’s failure: 
 
• Persistent losses: Co-op incurred persistent losses because of bad loans 
(www.newsinghana.com, www.ghanaweb.com and an anonymous 
source). 
• Liabilities were more than assets (www.ghanaweb.com). 
• Ineffective credit management: Co-op mismanaged its credit operations. 
Its management failed to perfect many securities attached to loans 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000, an anonymous source, 2002; 
www.ghanaweb.com and www.newsinghana.com).  
• Bad loans: Co-op had huge loans with bad quality (www.ghanaweb.com 
and an anonymous source, 2002). 
• Bad loans of about ø43 billion to a single borrower (A-Life Company): 
Co-op was defrauded by A-Life Company, thereby affecting its 
operations negatively (www.newsinghana.com, www.ghanaweb.com and 
Deloitte & Touche, 1996). The Ghanaian Times (January 20, 2000) 
observes that the liquidation was justified in view of the A-Life 
Company issue. According to the official liquidator (2000), the Serious 
Fraud Office is handling the large criminal unpaid loan owed by A-Life 
Company. 
• Declining deposit growth because of loss of confidence: The A-Life 
Company’s scandal led to a loss of depositor confidence in Co-op 
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evidenced by the steady reduction in deposits (www.newsinghana.com 
and an anonymous source). 
• Failure to satisfy the capital adequacy rule: Co-op failed to meet the 
capital adequacy ratio of 6% required by Bank of Ghana 
(www.ghanaweb.com and an anonymous source). 
• Incomplete financial information: Financial data on borrowers was 
inadequate or did not exist (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000). 
• Failure to satisfy the Central Bank’s reserve obligations: Co-op was 
unable to meet the statutory reserve requirements (an anonymous 
source). 
• Capital requirements: Co-op failed to meet the minimum funds obliged 
by Ghana banking law. (www.ghanaweb.com). 
 
5.2  Financial Status of Co-op 
 
Notes: 
1. * Figures are consolidated. 
2. ** Figures are unconsolidated. 
3. *** Figures are from 1/01/1999 to 17/01/2000. 
4. The ratios composed of a negative numerator and a negative denominator 
give positive products. Care should therefore be taken to take the composition 
into consideration in interpreting the meanings of the ratios. An example is the 
return on equity for 1996 of 131% made up of a net loss of ¢27,913 billion 
divided by a negative average equity of ¢5,330 billion. 
5. Formulae for the calculation of the ratios are in appendix 1. 
6. All figures that are shown in the capital adequacy return (table 4) but which 
are not found in the financial statements (tables 2 & 3) are in appendix 2. 
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Table 2:  Consolidated Profit and Loss Accounts 
 
For The Year Ended 31 December 
 
(¢’Million) 
 1993* 1994* 1995* 1996* 1997** 1998** 
       
Interest Income 2,286 2,586 4,596 7,969 6,679 9,172 
Interest Expenses -1,915 -1,305 -2,376 -4,339 -4,308 -4,525 
Net Interest Income 3 71 1,281 220 3,631 2,371 -4,646 
Commissions & 
Fees 
457 599 849 1,489 883 1,258 
Other Operating 
Income 
74 187 222 192 587 66 
Other Income 5,931 644 595    
Total Income  6,834 2,711 3,888 5,312 3,841 5,971 
Charge for Bad 
Debts 
-490 -674 -311 -22,731 -2,544 -5,595 
Operating Expenses -1,171 -1,715 -2,586 -3,904 -5,033 -6,098 
Other Expenses   -500 -6,590   
P/(L)BTax 5,172 323 491 -27,913 -3,735 -5,723 
Taxation -1,981 1,830 -300    
P/(L)ATax 
transferred to 
Income Surplus 
Account 
3,192 2,153 191 -27,913 -3,735 -5,723 
Source: Co-op’s audited financial statements 
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Table 3:  Consolidated Balance Sheets 
 
As at 31 December 
 
(¢’Million) 
 1993* 1994* 1995* 1996* 1997** 1998** 1999/2000***
        
ASSETS        
Cash & S/T F 2,238 5,388 6,835 23,238 -16,128 7,294 5,787 
Investments 5,249 6,519 9,040 12,472 11,175 14,053 8,804 
Net Loans  3,308 6,115 7,926 32,105 7,194 5,167 2,858 
Other Assets 992 1,535 6,760 2,562 2,903 3,028 1,402 
Tot. C. A. 11,687 19,558 30,561 70,377 5,143 29,542 18,851 
Goodwill 7,590 7,090 6,590     
Fixed Assets 297 646 999 1,169 1,200 965 3,944 
Taxation    171 524 524  
Tot. F. A. 7,887 7,736 7,589 1,340 1,724 1,488 3,944 
Inv. In. Sub.     5   
Total Assets 19,574 27,293 38,150 71,717 6,872 31,031 22,795 
        
Liab. & E.        
Deposits 9,338 16,055 24,081 34,300 25,384 29,474 28,173 
O. Cr 1,673 2,728 3,981 55,491 3,292 5,485 12,750 
Borrowings 1,633 1,633 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 25,599 
L/T Loans      23,599  
Taxation 1,977 86 273     
Tot. Liab. 14,621 20,503 29,535 90,991 29,876 59,757 66,522 
Stated Capital 2,914 2,914 4,547 4,572 4,572 4,572 4,572 
Cap. Surplus  184 184 184 184 184  
Inc. Surplus 2,039 3,693 3,883 -24,030 -27,760 -33,483 -48,299 
Equity 4,953  6,790 8,614 -19,274 -23,004 -28,726 -43,727 
Tot. Liab. E.  19,574 27,293 38,150 71,717 6,872 31,031 22,795 
Source: Co-op’s audited financial statements 
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Table 4:  Capital Adequacy Return 
 
December 31 
(¢’Million) 
 1994* 1995* 1996* 1997** 1998** 
      
1. Ordinary Capital 2,914 2,914 2,914 2,914 2,914 
2.Disclosed Reserves 3,877 4,067 -23,846 -27,576 -33,299 
3.P. Cap. (1+2) 6,790 6,981 -20,932 -24,662 -30,385 
4. Intangible Assets 7,090 6,590    
5. F. A. (incl. rev. res.) 646 999 1,169 1,200 965 
6. Adj. P. Cap. (3-4-5) -945 -608 -22,102 -25,862 -31,349 
7. H. (D/E) Cap. Ins.  1,633 1,633 1,633 1,633 
8. Cn. l. capital nature      
9. Adj. Cap. Bs (6-7-8) -945 -2,241 -23,735 -27,496 -32,983 
10. Tot. A. Bal. Sh. 
(Excl. contra items) 
27,293 38,157 71,717 6 ,872 31,031 
11. Cash 1,139 2,036 1,988 2,029 2,169 
12. Tr. Bl/B.O.G. Bl   7,711 6,414 7,849 
13. Government stocks   85 85 6,205 
14. M. D. House   5,000 5,442 400 
15. Bal. with B.O.G. 1,233 589 1,339 -23,599  2,827 
16. Inv. Un. Sub. Ass.      
17. Inv. in Cap. of O. 
Banks Fin. Inst. 
     
18. F. A. (incl. rev. 
res.) 
646 999 1,169 1,200 965 
19. Adj. Tot. A. 3,018 3,623 17,293 -8,429 20,414 
20. G. I. & Outst. 1,214 2,450 4,516 1,657 1,058 
21. Adj. A. Bs. 4,232 6,074 21,810 -6,772 21,472 
22. Adj. Cap. Bs-to-
Adj. A. Bs. 
-22% -37% -109% -406% -154% 
Required Ratio 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Source: Researchers made calculations based on Co-op’s financial statements. 
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Table 5:  Financial Ratios 
 
 1994* 1995* 1996* 1997** 1998** 
Profitability:      
Interest Margin (Total Assets) 1% 2% 2% 2% -6% 
Net Margin (After Tax) 57% 3% -289% -46% -55% 
Liquidity Risk 9% 12% 55% -76% 13% 
Asset Utilization 4% 5% 4% 5% 2% 
Return on Assets 2% 0% -13% -2% -8% 
Leverage Multiplier 402% 443% -372% -30% -108% 
Return on Equity 9% 1% 131% 4% 6% 
Earnings Power 92% 97% 119% 1 024% 146% 
Noninterest Expenses-to-Tot. A. 2% 2% 5% 3% 8% 
Net Nonint. Exps.-to-Tot. A. 0% 1% 4% 2% 6% 
Efficiency -63% -67% -73% -131% 201% 
Yield on Earning Assets 10% 12% 9% 9% 0% 
Cost Rate on Total Funds -1% -2% -2% -2% -6% 
Risk:      
Core Deposits-to-Assets 15% 16% 12% 132% 38% 
Liquid A.-to-Earning A. 7% 6% 15% 4% 3% 
Net Loans-to-Deposits 38% 33% 94% 28% 18% 
Net Loans-to-Core Deposits 149% 132% 362% 80% 43% 
Net Loans-to-Assets 22% 21% 45% 105% 17% 
Credit Quality:      
Credit Risk (this period) 22% 12% 47% -94% -40% 
Credit Risk (accumulated) 19% 21% 45% 87% 87% 
Interest Rate Sensitivity:      
Gap-to-Assets -1% -8% 42% -23% -26% 
Gap-to-Equity 190% 200% -47% -89% -56% 
Sensitivity 958% 1 765% 5 374% 1 984% 1 793% 
Capital Adequacy:      
Capital Risk 11% 12% 6% 67% 15% 
Equity Capital Risk 11% 4% 2% 24% 5% 
Adj. Cap. Bs-to-Adj. A. Bs. -22% -37% -109% -406% -154% 
Source: Ratios were calculated by researchers based on Co-op’s audited financial statements. 
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Our findings could not be exhaustive because we were unable to get all the 
relevant account figures to confirm some of the alleged causes of Co-op’s 
failure, such as the reserve requirements. Also, the A-Life Company issue is 
very important but we did not have any figures to explain its contribution to 
Co-op’s failure. However, our best guess is that it might have contributed to the 
huge loans portfolio of ø 47,9 billion in 1996 alone compared to other periods. 
Notwithstanding the constraints, we were able to find the following factors that 
contributed to the failure of Co-op. 
 
Co-op’s performance deteriorated from a net profit of ø 2,2 billion in 1994 to 
constant losses of ø 27,9 billion in 1996, ø 3,7 billion in 1997 and ø 5,7 billion 
in 1998. Co-op’s operating expenses contributed most to its low net profit of ø 
2.2 billion in 1994 because if operating expenses alone were eliminated, it 
could have made a net profit of ø 3.9 billion. If, however, the charge for bad 
and doubtful debts alone were eliminated, it could have made a net profit of ø 
2.8 billion. Therefore, the charge for bad and doubtful debts was the next 
contributory factor for the low profit in 1994. Without operating expenses Co-
op could have made a net profit of ø 2.8 billion in 1995. Meanwhile, 
eliminating other expenses that year, Co-op could have made a net profit of ø 
0,7 billion instead of the ø 0,2 billion that it generated in 1995. However in 
1996, the charge for bad and doubtful debts contributed most to the loss of ø 
27,9 billion. If this charge were eliminated the loss could have reduced to ø 5,2 
billion. In 1997, without operating expenses Co-op could have made a net 
profit of ø 1,3 billion instead of the net loss of ø 3,7 billion. For 1998 the net 
loss of ø 5,7 billion could have reduced to ø 0,128 billion if there was no 
charge for bad debts. Meanwhile, it could have made a net profit of ø 0,376 
billion if the operating expenses were eliminated. Therefore, operating 
expenses contributed the most to the loss in 1998. 
 
Over the reference period, assets of Co-op exceeded liabilities by ø 6,8 billion 
in 1994 and ø8,6 billion in 1995. The subsequent two years showed a 
downward trend in equity (liabilities exceeded assets): -ø 19,3 billion in 1996, -
ø 23 billion in 1997 and –ø 28,7 billion in 1998. 
 
The following ratios show the accumulated credit risk, which prove that Co-op 
had bad loans quality: 19% for 1994, 21% for 1995, 45% for 1996, 87% for 
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1997 and 87% for 1998. The credit risk for individual periods was 22% in 
1994; 12% in 1995 and worsened to 47% in 1996. However, in 1997 and 1998 
the risk improved to 94% and 40% respectively. Gross loans and overdrafts for 
the individual periods were ø 3,0 billion in 1994, ø 2,5 billion in 1995 and ø 
47,9 billion in 1996. In 1997 Co-op did not add to the loans portfolio but 
recovered a meager ø 2,7 billion from past due loans, while in 1998 its 
recoveries amounted to ø 13,9 billion. The charge for bad & doubtful debts for 
each of the years under consideration proves that Co-op’s credit management 
was inefficient. The charge was ø 0,674 billion in 1994, ø 0,311 billion in 1995, 
ø 22,731 billion in 1996, ø 2,544 billion in 1997 and ø 5,595 billion in 1998. 
This means that the charge increased by 37% from 1993 to 1994, improved by 
54% from 1994 to 1995, worsened by 7,209% from 1995 to 1996, improved by 
89% from 1996 to 1997 and deteriorated by 120% from 1997 to 1998. This was 
a result of Co-op giving out loans and overdrafts to the tune of ø 3,029 billion 
in 1994, ø 2,499 billion in 1995 and ø 47,9 billion in 1996 alone. With the high 
charge for bad & doubtful debts especially in 1996 and subsequent low charge 
in 1997 and a worsening situation in 1998, it is evident that Co-op mismanaged 
its credit portfolio. Additionally, management’s failure to perfect the security 
must have served as a disincentive for borrowers to repay their loans. This 
might have necessarily led to the huge bad loans, which contributed largely to 
the failure of Co-op. 
 
The auditors of Co-op (Deloitte & Touche), made comments about the going 
concern ability of Co-op in their audit reports issued for the years 1996, 1997 
and 1998.  
 
In the 1996 report, Deloitte & Touche stated that:  
The financial statements have been prepared on a going concern 
basis. This basis may not be appropriate because the bank incurred 
a loss of ø 27,901,681,000 during the year ended December 31, 
1996 and at that date its current liabilities exceeded its current 
assets by ø 20,437,795,000. An amount of ø 43 billion was owed by 
a single customer and substantial portion has to be recovered. These 
factors indicate that the Bank may be unable to continue trading. 
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In the 1997 report, Deloitte & Touche stated that:  
The financial statements have been prepared on a going concern 
basis. This basis may not be appropriate because the bank incurred 
a loss of ø 3,753,097,000 during the year ended December 31, 1997 
and at that date its current liabilities exceeded its current liabilities 
by ø 24,208,941,000. The total assets of the Bank has reduced from 
ø 71,695,727,000 to ø 6,872,064,000. Account with Bank of Ghana 
was overdrawn by ø 23,598,815,000. These factors indicate that the 
Bank may be unable to continue trading. 
 
In the 1998 report, Deloitte & Touche stated that:  
The financial statements have been prepared on a going concern 
basis. This basis may not be appropriate because the bank incurred 
a loss of ø 5,722,804,000 during the year ended December 31, 1998 
and at that date its current liabilities exceeded its current liabilities 
by ø 6,092,147,000. Should the Bank be unable to continue trading, 
adjustments would have to be made to reduce the value of the assets 
to the recoverable amount to provide for any further liabilities 
which might arise and to reclassify fixed assets and long-term 
liabilities as current assets and liabilities. 
 
Co-op failed to meet the capital adequacy requirement of 6% as stipulated in 
Ghana’s Banking Law of 1989, section 8. For the period under review, Co-op’s 
capital adequacy ratios were -22% in 1994, -37% in 1995, -109% in 1996, -
406% in 1997 and -154% in 1999. 
 
In conclusion, chapter five investigated why Co-op failed. Co-op was a 
Ghanaian bank, which was liquidated in 2000. Books, newspapers, articles 
from the internet and Co-op’s financial statements - profit and loss accounts 
and balance sheets (1994 to 1999/2000) were used in the investigation. To gain 
a broad understanding of the causes of the failure of Co-op, standard financial 
measures such as profitability ratios (table 5) were computed based on figures 
from Co-op’s financial statements (tables 2 & 3 and appendix 2). Many reasons 
for Co-op’s failure, such as constant losses, inefficient credit management, 
failure to satisfy the capital adequacy rule, incomplete financial information 
and failure to satisfy the Central Bank’s reserve obligations were found.
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6.  ANALYSIS 
 
Does Co-op’s failure confirm, challenge or extend the theories on some causes 
of bank failure? In order to answer this question, this chapter analyzes and 
reviewes the theoretical and empirical findings. Time series data covering 1994 
to 1999/2000 for performance indicators of Co-op were gathered as the basis 
for the case study. The data included financial statements, the official 
liquidator’s first and second creditors’ meeting reports, newspaper articles and 
internet resources. This was to establish the major causes of Co-op’s failure, 
which might have occurred over time before its eventual liquidation. In line 
with Yin (1994: 106), the analysis was also based on the existing literature as 
well as applying a descriptive approach by showing the operational 
performance of Co-op quantitatively to explain why it failed. The predictions 
were then matched with the actual events shown in the time series to confirm 
the theoretical propositions. The chapter also shows competing explanations to 
the various theoretical arguments as recommended by Yin (1994: 108-109). 
The following is the analysis and review of the findings of the case study versus 
the existing theories on some causes of bank failure. 
 
6.1  Deteriorating Economic Factors 
 
According to Hooks (1994), Eisenbeis (1986, cited by Hooks, 1994) and 
Goodhart et al. (1998), deteriorating local economic conditions (e.g. inflation, 
interest rates, and exchange rates) and macroeconomic factors (e.g., sudden 
adverse movements in a country’s terms of trade and sharp fluctuations in 
world interest rates, real exchange rates and inflation rates) worsened by 
regulations that are imposed on banks cause a bank failure. 
 
Benoni & Osei (2001) state that in 1998 the El Nino situation triggered drought 
and energy crisis, as the declining international economic activities adversely 
impacted on global prices of Ghana’s two main export commodities – gold and 
timber. In 1999 and 2000 Ghana’s economic system resulted in a budget deficit 
of about 8,8% of GDP. The failure of Co-op is consistent with the theoretical 
prediction. 
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6.2  Regulation of Banks 
 
6.2.1  Government Deposit Insurance Scheme 
 
According to various writers on banking - Goodhart et al. (1998), Kareken 
(1981, 1983, cited by Hooks, 1994), Kareken & Wallace (1978, cited by 
Hooks, 1994), Hooks (1994), Palubinskas & Stough (1999) and White (1993), 
a government deposit insurance scheme motivates banks to engage in risky 
investment activities. They explain that the scheme results in unpaid loans, 
because banks and customers have nothing at stake when deposits are badly 
managed or lost through fraudulent actions. They conclude that the system 
encourages unskilled management and fraudsters, irrespective of the regulation. 
The test of this proposition revealed that there was no government deposit 
insurance scheme instituted by Ghana government to protect Co-op from 
failure. Therefore, its demise is negatively related to the theoretical claim. 
 
On the other hand a competing claim by Kareken & Wallace (1978, cited by 
Hooks, 1994: 36) note that a deposit insurance scheme could reduce bank 
crises, because they may encourage banks to minimize their volume of risky 
investments. Eisenbeis (1986, cited by Hooks, 1994: 10) adds that regulation 
through a deposit insurance scheme should be based on the risk of an individual 
bank and a ceiling on the insurance scheme. Such a system can enhance the 
financial strength if it is sufficiently patronized, and controls like an effective 
banking supervision plan exist. (Helfer, 1999). 
 
Also Friedman (1960, cited by Hooks, 1994: 37) adds that a government 
deposit insurance system is valuable, because it eliminates the motive for 
depositors to start running away from one bank to the other. According to 
Kaufman (1996), a deposit insurance system, which gives a complete coverage 
may have a ceiling for each account and no coverage may be given above the 
ceiling. The system may give the depositors security and also motivate them to 
observe and control their banks via market forces and so complement 
prudential control. However, in theory, the exact sum of money for the ceiling 
is hard to set. 
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6.2.2  Prohibition of Banks from Establishing Branches and Limiting Bank 
Investments 
 
In the opinion of Selgin (1996), Hooks (1994), Goodhart et al.(1998), Hempel 
& Simonson (1999), O’Driscoll (1988, cited by Hooks, 1994) and White (1986 
cited by Selgin, 1996), geographical limitations pose significant threats to 
banks; branching restrictions could constrain banks from spreading their 
investment activities in different locations and banks may use flexible 
investment freedom to focus on limited higher-risk categories. They further 
observe that a branching limitation raises a bank’s vulnerability to risks for its 
liabilities as well as its assets. In this light Benston & Kaufman (1996 cited by 
Kaufman, 1996) states that limiting banking activities and branching rules that 
banks are subjected to for prudential purposes, may be eliminated. Co-op had 
21 branches across Ghana and so there is a negative relationship between its 
failure and the theoretical prediction. 
 
6.2.3  Capital Requirements 
 
Goodhart et al. (1998), Palubinskas & Stough (1999) and Polizatto state that as 
a bank’s capital decreases, the higher its motivation for actions towards 
survival, leading to more dangerous risk-taking activities. They add that capital 
is essential to cushion losses incurred by banks and that adequate funds reduce 
risk-taking, emphasizing that the more funds a bank has, the lower the 
probability of bankruptcy for any estimated risk. The test revealed that the 
equity of Co-op was ø 6,790 billion in 1994 and ø 8,614 billion in 1995. It 
declined to –ø 19,274 billion in 1996, -ø 23,004 billion in 1997, -ø 28,726 
billion in 1998 and –ø 43,727 billion in 1999/2000. The failure of Co-op 
suggests a positive relationship between inadequate capital requirements and a 
bank failure in conformity with the literature. 
 
6.2.4  Inadequate Reserve Requirements 
 
Friedman (1960, cited by Hooks, 1994) and White (1999) state that bank 
failures arise because banks do not keep all their deposits in statutory reserve 
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funds. The findings failed to test this theoretical hypothesis because the 
relevant data to confirm it were not available. 
 
6.2.5  Forbearance 
 
Hempel & Simonson (1999) and White (1993) state that forbearance 
contributes to bank crisis by permitting distressed banks to continue their 
operations. It is disadvantageous to banks, because usually when banks lack 
adequate funds and remain in operation, their capital situation deteriorates. Co-
op’s earnings of ø 2,153 billion in 1994, ø 0,191 billion in 1995, -ø 27,913 
billion in 1996, -ø 3,735 billion in 1997 and –ø 5,723 billion in 1998 showed a 
declining trend. This shows that it enjoyed forbearance for some years prior to 
the liquidation in 2000. Co-op’s failure is compatible with the literature. 
 
Opposing literatures by Eisenbeis & Horvitz (1994, cited by Goodhart et al., 
1996: 52-54) justify the importance of forbearance with the following 
arguments: (i) Dramatic liquidation of a bank could result in depositor run, 
which could be more expensive than rescuing the intermediary for some time 
and having it to survive profitably. (ii) Occasionally the closure, or fire sale 5of 
an intermediary (in some cases, its assets alone) could yield lower than its real 
intrinsic value. (iii) Some assets of a bank could have a higher value even in its 
distressed status than when the assets are placed under different management or 
under regulators. (iv) Empirical studies have proved that the ratio of liquidation 
expenditure to the assets of a liquidated bank is high. They conclude that if any 
or all the above points hold in any given situation, then the advantages of 
forbearance are higher than the disadvantages. Therefore, according to 
Eisenbeis and Horvitz, forbearance is good. 
 
                                          
5 Fire sale: A condition where prices of assets are considered to be very low. 
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6.2.6  Lender of Last Resort 
 
Selgin (1996) and White (1999) observe that governments use the lender of last 
resort mechanism to help some stakeholders of banks which are failing. This is 
done by either replenishing the reserves or combining the operations of 
distressed banks. The measure could rather encourage banks to engage in more 
risky activities. According to Bank of Ghanaweb site and Investek Consultancy 
Services Limited, Bank of Ghana is a lender of last resort for banks in Ghana. It 
is stated in the notes to the 1994 financial statements of Co-op that there was a 
take-over of the bank on July 15, 1992. Data in respect of the take over from 
which to ascertain if there was a lender of last resort implication in Co-op’s 
failure were unobtainable. Therefore, a direct relationship between Co-op’s 
failure and this theoretical argument could not be established. 
 
A competing theoretical argument about the lender of last resort is noted by 
Smith & Walter (1997: 158) who say that some nations have established 
mechanisms to give distressed banks solvency by repaying credits owed by 
borrowers. This is done to allay the fears of depositors. Hooks (1994: 38) notes 
that through the lender of last resort measure, a central bank identifies “illiquid 
from the insolvent” banks better than the banks themselves do. Kindleberger 
(1989, cited by Hooks, 1994: 38) is in favor of the lender of last resort measure 
and adds that the eagerness of banks to expand their activities is difficult to 
control. 
 
6.3  Deregulation of Banks 
 
Hooks (1994), Chu (1996) and Kareken (1981, 1983, cited by Hooks, 1994) 
state that deregulation encourages banks to engage in deceptive operations and 
over-expansion. If regulators eliminate the application of strict maximum 
deposit interest rates imposed on banks, resulting in the increase of deposit 
interest rates, banks will choose riskier investments. 
 
Ghana eliminated limitations on bank credits from 1988 to 1992. Since then 
Ghanaian banks are free to set the amount and choose the type of borrowers to 
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lend money to. Additionally, in 1987/88 ceilings on interest rates were 
removed, allowing banks to set their preferred interest rates on deposits and 
credits (www.winne.com). 
 
A single customer owed Co-op an amount of ø 43 billion and substantial 
portion had to be recovered (Deloitte & Touche, 1996). An anonymous source 
(2002) added that Co-op had given bad loans of about ø 36 billion to a single 
borrower (A-Life Company) thereby affecting its operations negatively. The 
failure of Co-op confirms the theoretical argument. 
 
Competing theoretical arguments by Hempel & Simonson (1999), Spollen 
(1997) and White (1984, cited by Hooks, 1994) note that banking regulation is 
a disincentive for other institutions, creditors and customers to effectively 
monitor their interests in banks in an independent way. They conclude that 
deregulation enhances banking stability. 
 
Selgin (1996) and Dothan & Williams (1980, cited by Hooks, 1994) state that 
the purpose of a ceiling on deposit interest rates (i.e. regulation) is to prevent 
banks from mobilizing deposits by giving borrowers big amounts of funds, 
with high interest income to the banks. They argue that the ceiling reduces a 
bank’s capability to mobilize funds when it becomes illiquid, concluding that 
this can cause bank failures. 
 
Co-op operated in a deregulated regime and so its capability to mobilize funds 
might not have been restricted. Hence it should not have failed if deregulation 
ensures banking stability. Its failure confirms that deregulation contributes to a 
bank failure. 
 
6.4  Mismanagement 
 
Spiegel et al. (1996) and Pantalone & Platt (1987, cited by Hooks, 1994) state 
that banking crises mostly come from the absence of good managerial ideas in 
decision-making, adding that excessive risk-taking is the main cause of bank 
failures. Palubinskas & Stough (1999) and White (1993) observe that a 
shortage of competent bankers in respect of loans’ risk appraisal contributes to 
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many of the loan defaults, lack of managerial skills leads to a situation where 
there is no credit evaluation. Co-op’s management’s failure to perfect many 
securities attached to loans and its eventual liquidation shows a direct 
relationship of its failure to the theoretical prediction. 
 
Spollen (1997), Goodhart et al. (1998) and Heffernan (1996) also add the 
following factors to the causes of the failure of an organization: insufficient 
number of staff, over-reliance on one member of staff, compensation tied to 
performance, inability of management to ensure compliance with laid down 
procedures, such as the board of directors not effectively addressing audit 
queries. The impact of these independent theoretical hypotheses on the failure 
of Co-op could not be tested because the relevant data were not obtainable. 
However, the empirical study revealed that Co-op incurred persistent losses and 
was unable to meet the required capital adequacy ratio of 6%. Throughout the 
time period under consideration, the external auditors pointed out this 
weakness, but it seems Co-op’s management ignored the warning. The failure 
to sustain earnings and meet capital adequacy ratio suggests that there existed a 
positive relationship between the theoretical hypotheses and Co-op’s failure. 
 
6.4.1  Fraud and Corruption 
 
Smith & Walter (1997), Fitchett (1996) and Heffernan (1996) state that fraud 
and corruption cause banks to fail. The empirical study could not test this 
theoretical supposition. The only clue on fraud and corruption hinges on the A-
Life Company issue, which is being handled by the courts. 
 
6.4.2  Poor Risk Management Procedures 
 
Hempel & Simonson (1999), Goodhart et al. (1998), Spollen (1997), Chimerine 
(1998), Palubinskas & Stough (1999) and Polizatto state that a bad lending 
tradition, such as lack of dependable financial information on borrowers for 
assessing creditworthiness, leads to a high portfolio of unpaid loans. They 
emphasize that bad loans and connected lending cause a bank failure. 
Kindleberger (1989, cited by Hooks, 1994) and White (1993) add that over 
investment is directly related to high risk-taking and this causes a bank failure. 
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Co-op had poor credit control, huge loans with bad quality and inadequate 
financial data on borrowers and its management failed to perfect many 
securities attached to loans (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000, an anonymous 
source, 2002 and ghanaweb.com). The empirical work revealed for example, 
that Co-op’s gross loans in 1996 of ø 47,9 billion were the riskiest investment 
during the time period under consideration. Co-op’s failure is therefore 
compatible with the theory. 
 
According to Goodhart et al. (1998), Heffernan (1996) and Polizatto another 
important variable, which leads to bank failure is asymmetric information 
between a bank and other stakeholders, such as investors and customers. This 
creates a moral hazard problem. The failure of Co-op implies that there might 
have been asymmetric information between Co-op and other stakeholders. This 
factor is difficult to quantify and therefore the direct relationship of Co-op’s 
failure and the theory could not be confirmed. 
 
6.5  Political Interference 
 
Goodhart et al. (1998) and Caprio & Honohan (1999) point out that politically 
directed lending leads to banking crisis. Occasionally, the credits are given to 
government suppliers leading to the failure of the banks involved. The 
implication of this is that such loans are not paid off. The empirical test could 
not investigate this theoretical argument because of its qualitative nature. 
Therefore, Co-op’s failure and its direct relationship to this theoretical 
argument could not be established. 
 
In summary, chapter six attempted to investigate the relationship between the 
failure of Co-op and the hypotheses on some causes of bank failure. The 
purpose was to test the theories using the failure of Co-op as empirical work. 
Financial measures were given to ascertain the degree of fragility of Co-op that 
caused its demise. Many different claims by different authors explaining why 
banks fail have been matched with some causes of Co-op’s failure. Competing 
explanations to the various arguments have also been shown. It was not, 
however, possible to confirm the relationship between Co-op’s failure and 
some of the propositions because of lack of relevant data. The approach 
Some Causes of Bank Failure – Analysis 
65 
revealed several different kinds of theoretical predictions and their direct 
relationship with Co-op’s failure. 
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7.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter concludes the thesis. It also gives some recommendations for the 
Ghanaian banking sector to help prevent or eliminate recurrence of bank 
failures. 
 
7.1  Conclusion 
 
The thesis has given theoretical and empirical answers to the question, why do 
banks fail in general and in particular, why did Co-op fail? This problem stated 
in chapter one has been solved as shown in chapters three to six. 
 
Chapter one gave the background of “Some Causes of Bank Failure”. It 
presented the problem, purpose, scope and delimitations of the study, 
concluding with an outline of the thesis. 
 
Bank failures can be harmful to the economy and so are considered very 
important and many writers have emphasized their costs implications. The 
costs and effects of banking instability necessitate a study of the causes of 
banking crisis. Many different hypotheses give explanations of the causes of 
the failures. This thesis tested the hypotheses, using the failure of Co-op as an 
empirical study. 
 
Chapter two provided the research design of the thesis. It showed the methods 
used to collect data (qualitative and quantitative) and resolve the problem, 
which included the study of different literatures on some causes of bank failure, 
an empirical study on Co-op and an analysis of the theories against the actual 
causes of the failure of Co-op. Competing (Rival) theories on some of the 
Causes of Bank Failure were given. To help with the evaluation of the worth of 
the research, the four validity tests - construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity and reliability were used. 
 
Chapter three analyzed and reviewed the theories on some of the factors behind 
banking crisis. It showed understandable theories and the conditions within 
which the theories are confirmed to result in bank failure. Several different 
authors have given different conditions that contribute to banking crisis. 
Some Causes of Bank Failure – Conclusion and Recommendations 
70 
Chapter four gave an overview of the Ghanaian economy. It also looked at the 
financial and banking systems in Ghana. The financial sector is divided into 
formal and informal sectors. There is a close relationship between the formal 
and informal financial sectors with respect to borrowing and lending activities. 
Ghana’s formal financial system is composed of banking and non-banking 
divisions. The banking system, which is relatively recent, was inherited from 
the British system. The general purpose of the various banking laws in Ghana 
is to safeguard assets and disclose relevant financial information. Ghana’s 
central bank (Bank of Ghana) replaced the West African Currency Board 
(WACB) after Ghana’s independence in 1957. The Bank of Ghana decree 
(1957) authorizes the central bank with the responsibility to print currency, be 
the Government’s banker and monetary representative, regulate the financial 
sector and supervise banks in Ghana, among others. The central bank is a 
lender of last resort for banks in Ghana. The banking law 1989 P.N.D.C.L 225 
gives effective prudential and regulatory foundation for the banking sector. 
 
Chapter five examined why Co-op failed using books, newspapers and articles 
from the internet and Co-op’s financial statements - profit and loss accounts 
and balance sheets (1994 to 1999/2000). To obtain good understanding of the 
causes of the failure, financial ratios based on figures from Co-op’s financial 
statements were computed. 
 
Chapter six attempted to investigate the relationship between the failure of Co-
op and the theoretical literatures on some causes of bank failure. The purpose 
was to test the theories on some causes of bank failure using the failure of Co-
op as empirical work. Financial measures were given to ascertain the degree of 
fragility of Co-op that caused its demise. Many different claims by different 
authors explaining why banks fail have been matched with some causes of Co-
op’s failure. Competing explanations to the various arguments have also been 
shown. It was not, however, possible to confirm the relationship between Co-
op’s failure and some of the theoretical propositions because of lack of relevant 
data. The approach revealed a direct relationship between several different 
kinds of theoretical propositions on causes of bank failure and Co-op’s failure. 
 
Some of the causes of Co-op’s failure have been found to confirm the 
theoretical predictions on some causes of bank failure. The purpose of this 
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study was to determine whether the causes of the failure of Co-op have already 
been a subject of well-formulated theories (Yin, 1994). The research has 
proved that the causes of the failure of Co-op have already been a subject of 
well-formulated theories on causes of bank failure. 
 
7.2  Recommendations 
 
The study has revealed some problems in Ghana’s banking sector as 
particularly related to Co-op. It has also shown some measures that could be 
used to avoid future bank failures in Ghana. These are discussed below. 
Howells & Bain (2000: 369) state that a general method to stabilize the banking 
sector is by stopping banks from engaging in high risk-taking. This could be 
achieved by constraining them to sell deposits and purchase credits. Goodhart 
et al. (1998: 38) add that the normal method for addressing loans risks is to 
assess intermediaries, check their credit policy and verify that they have 
sufficient funds as a buffer against delinquent loans. Hempel & Simonson 
(1999: 20) state that regulatory authorities should ensure that banks operate 
within secure and reliable rules, maintain a high level of observance of internal 
control in respect of loans, employee remuneration, other management 
activities and top executive competence. Hooks (1994: 49-50) advises 
regulators to constrain bank investment prospects to specific creditworthy 
groups or constrain the amount of funds committed to any one group. 
 
Hempel & Simonson (1999: 392) state that the loan philosophy and rules of 
banks should be observed with the right attitude. A successful loans approach is 
shown by employees’ adherence to management’s objectives in the loans 
department. It is also shown in the loans department’s methods and processes, 
which apply management’s objectives and reduce errors and bad credit 
practices. Spiegel et al. (1996) share this view by stating that the capability to 
prevent non-performing credits – to uphold a tradition of valuable loans by 
strong banking activities is a core feature of a better bank. 
 
In addressing strong administration and controls, Spollen (1997: 42, 61) 
advises that companies should be aware of the necessity of maintaining good 
management and controls such as sound, understandable, regular, periodic 
financial statements where the finance director gives details to the board of 
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directors about earnings generated. Internal audit reports should authenticate 
the existence and compliance levels of controls. Spollen (1997: 78, 94) touches 
on the creation of a control-conscious environment by stating that organizations 
should have documented rules and methods that are regularly revised, and 
effectively transmitted to all employees in order to ensure their successful 
application. This will protect a bank from failure arising from ignorance, 
negligence or deception. 
 
On the issue of effective internal audit function, Spollen (1997: 4, 42-43) notes 
that companies should have a strong internal audit to safeguard their investment 
portfolios, status and the interests of their stakeholders from failure. This will 
necessitate constant description of internal audit as a constructive risk-
concentrated tool, to discover, examine and guard the company from the main 
aspects of risks in the company. Spollen (1997: 57-58) continues by focusing 
on reporting lines and independence. He states that the internal auditor must be 
directly accountable to the top level management in an organization – the chief 
executive and the chairman of the audit committee. The proper communicating 
channels – specifically a direct route to the chairman of the audit committee 
enhances the independence of the internal auditor’s role. Disapproval and 
comments from internal audit enables timely remedial actions to be effected, 
thereby preventing failure. Spollen (1997: 54-56) further advises companies to 
set up efficient audit committees that should hold regular meetings. The 
meetings could be held with the head of internal audit, the finance director and 
the senior partner on the external audit team. Goodhart et al. (1998: 51) add that 
the status and integrity of an intermediary in managing risk could be enhanced 
by the existence of internal or external supervision of its operations. A bank 
could, therefore, institute an internal audit committee. The purpose is to have 
the internal audit system be accountable to an independent body, which can 
ensure that the chief executive officer addresses concerns that are within his 
authority. 
 
According to Hooks (1994) regulation - deposit insurance and the designation 
of a lender of last resort could reduce banking crisis. Studies by Friedman 
(1960, cited by Hooks, 1994: 37) and Kaufman (1996) support this view 
partially. Kareken (1981, 1983, cited by Hooks, 1994: 9) argues that 
government regulation is important because of the misrepresentations in banks’ 
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risk preferences, which result from deposit insurance. Hooks (1994: 39) 
believes that prudential regulation of banks can counteract misrepresentations 
resulting from government deposit insurance at a flat-rate fee. 
 
According to Hooks (1994), government control of banks by checking and 
examining their operations should be on a regular basis and comprehensive 
enough for it to be successful. Hempel & Simonson (1999: 20) add that apart 
from inspecting and examining the activities of banks, regulatory authorities 
should also pay attention to risks associated with the financial industry as a 
whole. Goodhart et al. (1998: xvii, 42) also advise that regulatory authorities 
may assist in reinforcing internal controls by basing the regularity and degree 
of their inspection on the quality of the management control system. In view of 
the differences involving the expenses incurred by intermediaries and other 
stakeholders, supervision should entail reliable rules that may not jeopardize 
the successful banks, but assist in preventing risk-prone banks. 
 
Palubinskas & Stough (1999) advise that a deposit insurance scheme by banks 
rather than by governments makes sure that each bank handles the scheme 
effectively, because banks fund the scheme themselves. Banks will be 
compelled to have the requisite working capital to address a crisis early. 
 
Polizatto (year not given) notes that those who oversee the operations of banks 
should check the organization and “strategic plans” of each bank and also 
consider the competence of managers to achieve the plans. They should ensure 
that existing management structures are adequate to guarantee conformity with 
laid down rules. They should also motivate banks to set up and reinforce their 
management structures in order to prevent banks from failing. Bank managers 
should have in place a documented financial plan, managerial communication 
systems, internal credit updates, operational manuals, internal and external 
audit operations, and internal management. Goodhart et al. (1998: 40-41) also 
add that many methods, practices and structures may assist to strengthen a 
bank’s risk-management systems. Internal auditors and audit committees, 
together with reporting lines to different levels of management, must be 
established. Like Polizatto and Goodhart et al., Spiegel et al. (1996: 51) 
emphasize that organizations should possess competent managers to guide 
them and make them concentrate on what gives them a competitive advantage. 
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Polizatto further advises that all banks should have in place strong accounting 
and internal control systems. Banking supervision guarantees effectiveness of 
the financial sector rather than the effectiveness of each bank and also 
safeguards the interests of depositors. Their operations should concentrate on 
high risk aspects of the banking system, especially banks whose failure could 
result in systemic risk. The high risk aspects include asset worth, interest rate 
hazard and foreign exchange operations. Banking supervisors should not check 
and inspect the operations of every segment of banks, but rather they should 
concentrate on segments that have important effects on a bank’s total situation. 
The rest of the segments should be assessed on a sample basis. 
 
Goodhart et al. (1998: xviii, 41) point out that even though regulators have a 
supervisory responsibility to banks, bank failures could be prevented when 
managers themselves address risks effectively. They add that irrespective of the 
skills of supervisors, the regulators may not be able to prevent human errors. 
 
According to Kaufman (1996) countries with high macroeconomic volatility 
should be subjected to higher capital adequacy rules with the aim of having 
immediate remedies for their problems. Dothan & Williams (1980, cited by 
Hooks, 1994: 36) add that monitoring a bank’s investments, especially their 
composition and level, may counteract its risky activities. It is important to 
require a bank to keep sufficient risk-free securities (bonds) to continue being 
solvent. 
 
Palubinskas & Stough (1999) and Kaufman (1996) name capital requirements 
as a possible mitigating factor against bank failures. Goodhart et al. (1998: 57) 
advise that the more funds a bank has, the lower the probability of bankruptcy 
for any estimated risk. Therefore, supervisors should apply different measures 
in line with the position of capital at every point in time. Howells & Bain 
(2000) state that the law for maintaining solidity of banks focuses on capital 
adequacy requirements. They also share the same opinion with Eatwell (2000: 
40, 42) who notes that capital adequacy rules oblige banks to keep a specified 
percentage of the total assets in liquid funds. Kareken & Wallace (1978, cited 
by Hooks, 1994: 36) agree with capital adequacy rules but add that the rules do 
not help when used in isolation. 
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Hempel & Simonson (1999) and White (1993) advise that banks must be 
encouraged to cease their operations as their earnings sustainability reduces, 
because forbearance could result in the public bearing the burden of their 
failure in the long run. 
 
Kinsey (1998: 19) states that issues of data control and expenditure on assets 
have compelled banks to handle their records in a better manner. Hence, 
regulators require banks to keep their data in good way. Spiegel et al. (1996) 
add that banking is now a knowledge-based discipline. Acknowledgment of 
this know-how is a key point in the sustainability of earnings of banks. 
Enhanced expertise permits banks to reduce their operational expenses, 
maintain improved communication channels and client data to boost 
performance. Essinger (1999: 26) also notes that virtual banking has two 
advantages: it minimizes irregularities involving cheques, which is the main 
reason given for losses incurred by banks; it also assists banks to maintain 
complete records of every operation. This is because all the transactions are 
computer-based and this enhances audit trail, which is seen to be the most 
appropriate method of internal control. These recommendations could be a 
useful guide for preventing the recurrence of bank crises in Ghana and perhaps 
elsewhere.
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8.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This chapter gives suggestions for further research. Future research may focus 
on the following sub-units of Co-op which were outside the scope of this thesis: 
 
Credit Management of Co-op 
 
The research revealed that the major cause of Co-op’s failure was its inefficient 
credit management. This resulted in a huge portfolio of bad loans that impacted 
negatively on its performance. Areas such as the availability of financial 
information on borrowers to help in assessing creditworthiness, appraisal of 
credit status, excessive focus on giving loans to certain customers and credit 
control may be of interest. 
 
Deposit Growth of Co-op 
 
The assertion that the A-Life Company’s scandal led to a loss of depositor 
confidence in Co-op evidenced by the steady reduction in deposits, as obtained 
in the study could not be investigated. Deposits were ¢ 16,055 million in 1994, 
¢ 24,081 million in 1995, ¢ 34,300 million in 1996, ¢ 25,384 million in 1997, ¢ 
29,474 million in 1998 and ¢ 28,173 million in 1999/2000. Even though at a 
glance one could conclude that there was a declining trend, it will be better to 
conduct a comprehensive study of the various types of deposits and their 
decline over the time period under consideration. 
 
Inadequate Reserve Requirements 
 
The failure of Co-op to satisfy the Central Bank’s reserve obligations could not 
be confirmed by this research due to lack of information on relevant data of Co-
op. An investigation of this assertion may reveal whether there was 
mismanagement of funds such as financial slack or whether Co-op simply did 
not have enough funds. 
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Lender of Last Resort 
 
Bank of Ghana is a lender of last resort to banks in Ghana. Co-op might have 
perceived that the central bank was going to intervene when it failed. In this 
light the measure served as an incentive for Co-op to engage in more risky 
activities. 
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Appendix 1   
 
Financial Ratios Formulae 
 
Profitability 
 
Assets Total Average
IncomeInterest Net   Assets) (TotalMargin Interest =  
Revenues
IncomeNet   Tax)(After Margin Net  =  
Deposits Total
Borrowing TermShort  - Aseets Liquid Risk Liquidity =  
Assets Average
Revenues ization Asset Util =  
Assets Average
IncomeNet   Assetson Return =  
Equity
Assets  Multiplier Leverage =  
Equity Average
IncomeNet  Equity on Return =  
Assets Total
Assets Earning Power  Earnings =  
Assets Total Average
Expensesinterest -Non  Assets Total  toExpensesinterest -Non =  
Assets Total Average
Incomet Noninteres - Expensest Noninteres  Assets Total  toExpensest NoninteresNet =
IncomeNoninterstIncomeInterst Net 
Expensest Noninteres  Efficiency +=  
Assets Earning Average
IncomeInterest  Assets Earningon  Yield =  
Equity Average  sLiabilitie Total Average
ExpensesInterest  Funds Totalon  RateCost +=  
 
 
Risk 
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Assets Total
Deposits Core Assets  toDeposits Core =  
sInvestment term-Short-Assets Earning
year) 1( sInvestment term-Short Assets Earning-to-Assets Liquid <=  
Deposits Total
 LoansNet  Deposits-to-LoansNet =  
Deposits  Core
LoansNet  Deposits Core-to-LoansNet =  
Assets Total
 LoansNet  Assets-to-LoansNet =  
 
Credit Quality 
 
period) (This Loans Gross
period) (This Expenses LossLoan for Provision  period) (ThisRisk Credit =  
LoansGrossdAccumulate
LossesLoan for Provision  dAccumulate ed)(AccumulatRisk Credit =  
 
Interest Rate Sensitivity 
 
AssetsTotal
sLiabilitie Sensitive RateInterest -Assets Sensitive RateInterest  Assets-to-Gap =  
Equity
sLiabilitie Sensitive RateInterest -Assets Sensitive RateInterest  Equity-to-Gap =  
sLiabilitieSensitive RateInterest 
Assets Sensitive RateInterest  ySensitivit =  
 
Capital Adequacy 
 
Assets Total
Capital Total Risk Capital =  
Assets Total
EquityCommon  Risk CapitalEquity =  
BaseAsset   Adj.
Base Cap. Adj.  BaseAsset  Adj. to-Base Cap. Adj. =  
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Appendix 2 
 
Figures included in the calculations of financial ratios but which are not 
shown separately in the profit/(loss) statements and the balance sheets 
 
(¢’Million) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Short-term funds  3,015 4,210 19,910 5,442 2,299 
Earning Assets (Interest 
Rate Sensitive Assets): 
      
Balances with Banks + 
Money at call 
 3,015 4,210 19,910 5,442 2,299 
Government Securities  6,519 9,040 12,472 11,175 14,053 
Net Loans and Overdrafts  6,115 7,926 32 ,05 7,194 5,167 
Total  15,650 21,176 64,487 23,810 21,519 
Noninterest expenses:       
Operating Expenses  1,715 2,586 3,904 5,033 6,098 
Other Expenses   500 6,590   
Total  1,715 3,086 10,494 5,033 6,098 
Noninterest Income:       
Commissions and Fees  599 849 1,489 883 1,258 
Other Operating Income  187 222 192 587 66 
Other Income  644 595    
Total  1,430 1,667 1,681 1,471 1,324 
Core Deposits - Savings 
Deposits (most stable 
funds) 
 4,105 6,002 8,873 9,042 11,885 
Accumulated Gross Loans  4,540 7,569 10,068 58,000 55,285 41,292 
Accumulated Provision 
for Loan Losses 
1,232 1,454 2,142 25,895 48,092 36,125 
Deposits (Interest Rate 
Sensitive Liabilities) 
 16,055 24,081 34,300 25,384 29,474 
Gross Loans (this period)  3,029 2,499 47,932 -2,715 -13,994
Cash in Hand  1,139 2,036 1,988 2,029 2,169 
Treasury Bills    7,711 6,414 7,849 
Government Stocks    85 85 6,205 
Money at Discount House    5,000 5,442 400 
Balances with B.O.G.  1,233 589 1,339 -23,599 2,827 
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Appendix 3 
 
Definitions 
 
Asymmetric information: A situation where one party to a financial 
transaction has better information than the other about factors relevant to the 
transaction. 
 
Bail out: For example, the government may give a subsidy to a borrower by 
granting the borrower monopoly privilege or other means to improve its profits 
and thereby repay loans or by directly injecting funds into banks.  
 
Connected lending: Loans extended to banks’ owners or managers and to their 
related businesses. 
 
Forbearance: Abstaining from the enforcement of a right to close a bank 
which is making losses. 
 
Going concern concept: That an enterprise will continue in operational 
existence for the foreseeable future. 
 
Moral hazard: Actions by economic agents in maximizing their own utility to 
the detriment of others in situations where they do not bear the full 
consequences of their actions. 
 
Regulation: Changing the behavior of financial intermediaries through the 
creation of the appropriate incentive structure. 
 
Systemic risk: Risk for the whole of the financial system, probably arising 
through contagion from problems in individual banks, sectors of the market or 
countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
